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WORLDS BEYOND THEORY: TOWARD THE 
EXPRESSION OF AN INTEGRATIVE 
ETHIC FOR SELF AND CULTURE 
Peter Read Teachout* 
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND 
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY. 
By James Boyd White. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
1984. Pp. xvi, 377. $25. 
Whatever one reads with close attention to the words and also to the 
things the words mean is the instrument of a liberal culture,· whatever one 
reads otherwise, whether philosophy or history or poetry, is not. 
Leo Stein1 
Tradition is to preserve, to refresh, to transmit, and to increase our insight 
into what men have done as men, in their art, their learning, their poetry, 
their religion, their politics, their science .. . [It is to] understand what is 
happening to us, to talk to one another, to relate one thing to another, to 
find the great themes which organize our experience and give it meaning. 
It is what makes us human. 
J. Robert Oppenheimer2 
James Boyd White's When Words Lose Their Meaning is a work of 
great and refreshing originality. I can think of no other work by a 
legal scholar within the past decade that addresses more thoughtfully 
or intelligently the fundamental conditions of our existence in the law. 
White's book is a fascinating inquiry into the role of argument in cul-
ture - into the way in which the imaginative employment of the "rhe-
torical resources" of a culture can operate to criticize and transform 
that culture. Nor is this merely an academic inquiry. White addresses 
here in the most immediate way the central issue that has preoccupied 
American legal scholarship for the past two decades and almost singly 
given rise to the law and theory movement: the problem of discover-
ing a coherent ethical perspective from which to view the activity of 
law in culture. The heart of White's effort is to forge out of a critical 
reading of the traditional classics of our literature a truly integrated 
"ethic": a critical mode of approaching experience that will stand us 
• Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. B.A. 1962, Amherst College; J.D. 1965, Harvard 
University; M.A. 1967, University of Sussex. - Ed. 
1. L. STEIN, APPRECIATION: PAINTING, POETRY AND PROSE 23 (1947). 
2. Oppenheimer, The Future of Civilization in the Scientific Age, 17 FRANcE-As1E 1807, 
1808-09 (1961). 
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in good stead at every level of endeavor - in our understanding and 
use of language, in the conduct of our personal and professional lives, 
and in our efforts to comprehend and improve upon our inherited 
culture. 
In both its method and thrust, this is a work quite unlike anything 
we have seen before in the law. It is not a work of theory but some-
thing quite different, a work that proceeds upon the critical exposition 
of a series of classic texts: Homer's Iliad, Thucydides' History, and 
Plato's Gorgias from early Greek literature; Swift's Tale of a Tub, 
Johnson's Rambler essays, Austen's Emma, and Burke's Reflections 
from eighteenth century English literature; and, from our own early 
constitutional period, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitu-
tion, and Marshall's classic opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. It is 
not accidental that the works White has selected are not works of the-
ory but rather, for the most part, examples of what we call imaginative 
literature, nor is it accidental that White's development of his thesis 
takes this peculiar form, not of theory, but of a composition of critical 
readings. For, as we shall see, it is one of White's purposes to show 
that imaginative literature of this sort offers possibilities for the criti-
cism and transformation of culture that theory does not, and that criti-
cal reading itself can be a disciplined art capable of powerfully 
illuminating who we are and the conditions of our existence. Indeed, 
it is one measure of the achievement of this extraordinary work that it 
pushes beyond the bounds of theory, carving out entire new fields of 
play for the critical and creative intelligence. 
When Words Lose Their Meaning is one of those truly complex 
works that operates simultaneously at many different levels, and it 
must be read and taken that way to be understood. At one level, 
White's book is a highly original "essay" (in the classical sense of that 
term) in critical reading, a demonstration of the way in which critical 
reading can be an important if not indispensable instrument of one's 
liberal and legal education. At another, it is a masterful exposition of 
the ways in which language, character, and culture are inextricably 
bound together. A central aim of White's book is to show us how the 
critical and creative employment of inherited language can serve as a 
powerful force for the "reconstitution" of both self and community. 
The relationship we establish to words, White makes clear, very much 
determines who we are - not only as individuals but as a culture. At 
a third level, White's book can be seen as an important statement of 
conscience. What I mean by this is something that can be made clear 
only as we go on, but for now let me say simply that the entire move-
ment of the work is toward the expression of a truly complex ethical 
perspective, one that unites both method and vision in an integrated 
view of the world. It is of the essence of what White sets out to do 
here, moreover, that we come away from this work somehow better 
equipped to know and judge the "character" not only of ourselves and 
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of what we write, but of the culture of which we are a part. Finally, 
White's book is a composition in its own right, with its own powerful 
design and movement. This is one of those rare works that "realizes" 
the values it advocates not only in the exposition but in its own 
performance. 
It might be thought that a "literary" book like this, a book that 
purports to be about reading the classics, would have little to do with 
the important philosophical and political questions with which con-
temporary legal scholarship deals. But that is not true. In fact what 
White does here has direct and pervasive relevance to the major issues 
which currently occupy the field of jurisprudential writing. White's 
essay on Thucydides' History, for example, sheds powerful light on the 
disintegrative tendencies underlying the effort by some economic theo-
rists to transform the traditional language of legal discourse into the 
terms of the utilitarian cost-benefit calculus. And, collectively, his es-
says on the eighteenth century English writers make clear what is 
wrong with the response of the radical communitarian theorists to the 
challenge posed by classical economic theory. Indeed, it could be ar-
gued that the entire movement of his work is toward the provocative 
redefinition of the ethical responsibilities of the lawyer in our culture. 3 
But this somewhat misstates the book's essence, for in a very real sense 
these problems, at least as they have conventionally been formulated 
in the ethical and theoretical literature, are not White's problems. Yet 
in transformed guise they are omnipresent, and what White has to say 
here has important implications for how we approach them. In other 
words, this little book about reading and writing turns out in the end 
to be a work with inescapable political and ideological implications. 
When Words Lose Their Meaning is a book finally about the shape of 
our culture, not only what it is, but what it ought to be. 
I. BASIC THEME AND STRUCTURE 
White takes his central theme from a passage in The History of the 
Peloponnesian War in which Thucydides is describing the terrible dis-
solution of the Hellenic world under the pressures of war and revolu-
tion. It is a passage that dramatically depicts the consequences for self 
and culture "when words lose their meaning": 
The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and 
3. White puts it this way in his preface: 
[T]his book, despite appearances, is really about law from beginning to end. Indeed, one of 
its objects . . . is to set forth a rather different conception of law from those that presently 
prevail in academic circles: as an art essentially literary and rhetorical in nature, a way of 
establishing meaning and constituting co=unity in language. 
P. xi. The ethical implications for the lawyer of regarding language and experience as White 
proposes are addressed in the last chapter of the book and elaborated in a separately published 
essay, White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and The Modem Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 849 (1983). 
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terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as long as the 
nature of mankind remains the same . . . . [W]ar takes away the easy 
supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough master, that brings most 
men's characters to a level with their fortunes. Revolution thus ran its 
course from city to city, and the places which it arrived at last . . . car-
ried to a still greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as mani-
fested in the cunning of their enterprises and the atrocity of their 
reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that 
which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the 
courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice, modera-
tion was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a 
question inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute 
of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defense. The 
advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a 
man to be suspected. 4 
The importance of this passage lies in the critical insight it offers into 
the complex relationship of reciprocity that exists between the lan-
guage of a culture and the integrity and stability of the culture itself. 
To destroy the integrity of a shared cultural language, Thucydides 
suggests, undermines the stability of the culture, and if carried far 
enough can ultimately lead to its disintegration and collapse. 
The words Thucydides describes here as having lost their meaning 
- words such as "courage" and "prudence" and "moderation" -
were not simply tangential words in Hellenic culture, White points 
out, but "key terms of value" (p. 3); their corruption made it virtually 
impossible for the culture to go on as before. The corrurition of its 
language effectively deprived the Greek world of vital rhetorical re-
sources necessary to sustain its sense of worth, direction, and meaning 
- its sense of its own character - and that more than anything else 
led to its ultimate dissolution. What is involved, White stresses, is not 
a simple cause-and-effect relationship, but a complex dynamic of reci-
procity involving all three elements: language, individual character, 
and culture. The subtle corruption of one undermines the integrity of 
the other, which in turn leads to a subtle erosion of the third, and so a 
destructive downward spiral begins. 
What Thucydides is describing here is not an isolated historical 
phenomenon but a universal human predicament which will recur "as 
long as the nature of mankind remains the same"; thus his observation 
has continuing relevance for us. What do we do when the language of 
our own culture seems to be undergoing the kind of erosion or corrup-
tion that Thucydides describes? More importantly, what possibilities 
exist for "reconstituting" language thus corrupted and, with it, the 
culture itself in more vital and enduring terms? 
"Culture" as it is used here may mean culture writ large, of course, 
4. THUCYDIDES, THE HlsTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 189 (Modern Library 1951) 
(emphasis added). 
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but it may also refer to a more specific social, institutional, or profes-
sional culture. And the "collapse" itself may also take a number of 
different forms. In the paradigmatic situation we encounter in Thu-
cydides' History, the collapse is vivid and dramatic, brought on by the 
awful pressures of plague, revolution and war. But the words of a 
culture can also lose their meaning as a consequence of a much more 
subtle play of forces, for example as the result of constant misuse, so 
that words that once had real vitality and meaning are reduced to 
mere platitude or otherwise become so debased that they lose much of 
their original discriminating power.5 They become in a very real sense 
"meaning" -less. It is the struggle of the human imagination in the 
face of this universal predicament that is White's subject in this book. 6 
In seeking to illuminate this predicament and the possibilities for 
response to it, White does not embark upon a theoretical inquiry into 
the relationship of language to culture, but turns instead to the classics 
of imaginative literature identified above. Each chapter of his book 
forms a separate self-contained essay on a particular classic text, and 
in each essay White pursues the central question: what possibilities 
are represented here for transforming or revitalizing inherited culture 
through the imaginative reconstitution of its rhetorical resources? By 
taking this approach White is able to show us the individual imagina-
tion at work in a wide variety of contexts, first criticizing the existing 
culture and its language and exposing its inadequacies, and then forg-
ing out of those inherited materials a new cultural language which 
offers restored or enriched possibilities for the realization of self and 
5. In contemporary jurisprudential literature, the collapse of language is most visibly re-
flected in the writings of the linguistic nihilists within the Critical Legal Studies movement. It is 
impossible not to be acutely aware of the extent to which "words have lost their meaning" in the 
recent interchange between Professors Peter Gabel and Duncan Kennedy. Gabel & Kennedy, 
Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984). Both Kennedy and Gabel are ultimately re-
duced to using language as something like a brick to throw in the direction of the reality that 
each wants to express. Gabel can find no other way to talk about what he clearly regards as the 
most important human relationships except by using terms like "unalienated relatedness," id. at 
1, 4, or "authentic connectedness," id. at 30; and Kennedy about those that he regards that way 
as "intersubjective zap." Id. at 4, 6, 11. These words all become utterly interchangeable, all 
"formulae" for the same thing. See id. at 4-5. This is not what one would describe as a moral 
language of extraordinary range and discriminating power. 
It may be that Kennedy and Gabel have reached the limits of inherited cultural language and 
their difficulties here are a reflection of their effort to press beyond those limits. But there is little 
evidence of that in their transcribed conversation. 
Some see the Critical Legal Studies movement as a leftist revolutionary movement committed 
to the struggle of peoples everywhere against oppression and injustice, but the kind of talk we 
encounter in the Kennedy /Gabel dialogue clearly has more affinity with the "dadaist" movement 
in art in its nihilistic and self-mocking tendencies. What is most striking about Critical Legal 
Studies writing is the extent to which it forms a self-regarding literature whose central character-
istic is that of looking at itself in the mirror. Others have noted the essentially "platitudinous" 
quality of the Critical Legal Studies literature. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 
36 STAN. L. REv. 247, 283 (1984). 
6. For a powerfully moving portrayal of the struggle to make sense out of a world in which 
words have lost their meaning, see the award winning novel about life in postwar co=unist 
Poland, c. MILOSZ, THE SEIZURE OF POWER (1955). 
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community. One important consequence of taking such an approach 
is that the focus is not so much on the reconstituted culture itself (in 
any case, not on that culture as the static embodiment of a particular 
set of values) as on the capacities of mind and character required to 
transform inherited language and culture in this way. 
However, to see White's book simply as a series of discrete, self-
contained essays is to ignore its most impressive aspect. For When 
Words Lose Their Meaning is a remarkable composition in its own 
right, with its own complex pattern and movement, its own deep integ-
rity. The fact is that White's reading of each classic text is informed 
by his reading of all the others - and self-consciously so. As a conse-
quence, there is a certain cumulative perspective at work at any partic-
ular point in the book that one cannot fully appreciate until one has 
read the entire work through. It is as if White has woven eight sepa-
rate tapestries out of the same basic material, in each case the woof 
strand being supplied by the text immediately at hand with the weft 
strands supplied by those classic texts dealt with in the other chapters. 
Or perhaps it is like eight windows, or doorways, opening into the 
same large room. There is a kind of integrity to the whole that would 
be missed entirely by viewing each chapter as involving simply the 
discrete critical treatment of a particular text. 
But even this imagery fails to suggest the basic structure of White's 
work, which is in some respects like that of a picaresque novel. 7 Our 
central experience here consists of a series of encounters with distinct 
worlds-here represented by particular classic texts - out of which a 
complex and coherent ethical vision gradually emerges. Each world 
stands for a particular community of traditions and values and aspira-
tions - for a particular way of dealing with experience, of making 
sense out of it. Each offers us an important education and, more than 
that, the possibility of real friendship and community. But there is a 
sense in which none of these communities can be a final resting point, 
for it is an essential part of the character of the picaresque hero that he 
resist the stasis of ultimate embrace by any particular community. A 
very important aspect of his education is learning to make his own 
way. His predicament, as Saul Bellow's Augie March once said, is 
how to have "[a]n independent fate, and love too."8 But if this is a 
predicament, it is also a challenge, and one addressed directly by 
White in this book: how to have a world in which genuine community 
is not only possible but central, in which one's commitments can be 
deep and lasting, and yet in which the possibilities for the development 
7. See generally R. ALTER, ROGUE'S PROGRESS: STUDIES IN THE PICARESQUE NOVEL 
(1964); A. BLACKBURN, THE MYTH OF THE PICARO: CoNTJNUITY AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE PICARESQUE NOVEL, 1554-1954 (1979); S. MILLER, THE PICARESQUE NOVEL (1967). 
8. S. BELLOW, THE ADVENTURES OF AUGIE MARCH 401 (1953). 
February 1985] Worlds Beyond Theory 855 
of self and community are not closed in by system but ultimately char-
acterized by a certain poetic open-endedness. 
A. The Greek Trilogy: The Transformation of Culture Through 
The Imaginative Reconstitution of Inherited Language 
White begins with separate chapters on three Greek classics: Ho-
mer's Iliad, Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, and Plato's 
Gorgias. His approach to these texts is deeply influenced by the view 
that each represents a literary and ethical performance. White is not 
concerned with extracting from these texts some poetical paraphrase 
of truths that can be as easily stated in the abstract language of theory. 
The real "meaning" of these works, he insists, lies at the level of per-
formance itself. Put somewhat differently, to appreciate fully the ethi-
cal vision in each of these works, we must understand how the explicit 
claims made at the surface fit into the larger imaginative design of the 
work. We must look for the expression of ethical vision in the way 
words and sentences are put together, in the literary forms that are 
employed, and in the pattern and movement of the work as a whole. 
1. Homer's Iliad: Awakening Complexities in the Human Heart 
Homer's Iliad, as White views it, is a culture-transforming work. 
The poem moves us from an ethical perspective bounded by the values 
and expectations of heroic culture to a more complex awareness of 
possibilities for self and community. Working entirely with the 
materials of heroic culture, White claims, Homer not only finds a way 
to get critical distance on that culture but succeeds in giving expres-
sion to a vision of human relationships "seemingly inexpressible in in-
herited terms" (p. 93). 
White elaborates upon two central characteristics of the world we 
encounter in the early moments of the poem. First, it is a world 
shaped by the values and expectations of heroic culture, the great aim 
of which is the acquisition and maintenance of "honor" expressed pri-
marily in the form of battle prizes. Second, it is a deeply unstable 
world: "a world that trembles on the edge of dissolution" (p. 31). 
This instability is reflected in part in the nature of the cultural lan-
guage itself; in part in the character and conduct of the leader of the 
Achean forces, Agamemnon; and, perhaps most dramatically of all, in 
the breakdown of community that results from the argument between 
Achilles and Agamemnon over the slave girl, Briseis. The fact that 
this seemingly manageable dispute cannot be resolved or contained, 
White argues, reflects a fundamental defect in the culture's "rhetorical 
resources" (p. 37). In this case, the argument is concluded when Aga-
memnon simply asserts his prerogative as leader to take the girl. 
Achilles, deeply dishonored, stalks off angrily to his tents, vowing 
never to return to the aid of the Acheans. In this part of the poem, 
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White shows us, the dominant imagery is of instability and 
disintegration. 
Achilles' departure from the Achean community, White main-
tains, represents a literary and cultural moment of enormous signifi-
cance. Achilles "cannot be wholly part of his world, yet he cannot 
wholly leave it; ... [thus] he becomes a figure on the edge of things" 
(p. 38). We suddenly find ourselves with Achilles looking at heroic 
culture from the outside; we are in effect forced to become critics of 
that culture. Nothing less is involved in this important literary mo-
ment, White insists, "than the beginning of social awareness and criti-
cism" (p. 39). 
The most significant moment in the second major section of the 
poem is Achilles' dramatic rejection of Agamemnon's attempt to effect 
reconciliation. The Acheans have been beaten back to their ships, and 
a repentant Agamemnon sends a delegation to Achilles to try to per-
suade him to return to the battle. He offers Achilles opulent gifts in 
accordance with the conventions of the culture. In rejecting the ap-
peals of the Achean delegation, White shows us, Achilles is led to re-
ject the values of heroic culture itself. The enormous force of this 
moment comes in part from the fact that it occurs in the context of 
this epic poem, in a literary narrative. The world of the Iliad, as 
White brings us into contact with it here, is as vivid and immediate as 
experience itself. 
Achilles' dilemma is that, having rejected the values of heroic cul-
ture, he is unable to articulate any coherent alternative. This is re-
flected, White observes, in the internal confusion of his rejection 
speech: 
The problem is that [Achilles] has, as it were, no other place to go, no 
language other than his inherited one in which to establish himself and 
his motives. He lacks the resources with which to make a coherent and 
intelligible statement . . . . The statement he does make is one of anger 
and rejection rather than invention and reformulation. [P. 49.] 
But if Achilles is unable to carve out an alternative place to stand, 
that is not true of Homer. In a highly illuminating analysis, White 
shows us how Homer succeeds in doing so, primarily through employ-
ment of what White calls the "art of juxtaposition" (p. 39). One mani-
festation of this art is Homer's technique of carrying us, in the course 
of the narrative, back and forth between opposing camps. By describ-
ing the experience of the Acheans and that of the Trojans "in identical 
terms, expressive of identical feelings" (p. 39), White observes, Homer 
creates an "extraordinary sense of equity"9 and makes it possible for 
the poem's audience to escape the narrow partisanship required by he-
roic culture. By constantly juxtaposing alternative perspectives on the 
9. P. 39 (quoting S. Weil, L'lliade ou lepoeme de la force, CAHIERS DU SUD (Dec. 1940-Jan. 
1941)). 
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war, Homer manages to achieve "the recognition of the equal human-
ity of the people who must suffer on both sides" (pp. 39-40). 
Homer's art of juxtaposition is reflected as well in his use of do-
mestic and pastoral similes to describe the experience of the war. At 
one point, for example, Homer compares the watchfires of war to 
"stars seen on a clear, still night by a shepherd, whose heart they make 
glad" (p. 40). This juxtaposition of pastoral image and martial de-
scription, which recurs throughout the Iliad, is not simply accident, 
White argues, nor is it simply the reflection of requirements of poetic 
form. Rather it serves a plain and important artistic function: to 
awaken complexities in the human heart (pp. 41-43). 
All of this, White continues, prepares us for the powerful and 
deeply poignant moment of reconciliation between Achilles and Priam 
that takes place in the closing episode of the poem. In a rare act of 
courage, Priam, the aged father of Hector, comes alone in the night to 
Achilles' tent to plead for the return of his son's body for burial. It is 
a tension-charged moment because Priam's son, Hector, has killed 
Achilles' only close friend, Patroclus, on the battlefield, and Achilles 
in revenge has slaughtered Hector and in unquenchable anger at-
tempted to mutilate his body. Yet Achilles responds to the old man's 
request not with anger but with sympathy. He not only grants Priam's 
request, but invites him to share food and drink before departing. The 
old man and the warrior then embrace, weeping together over the loss 
and suffering that each recognizes in the other. The transcendent im-
pulse in this moment is not that of heroic partisanship, but the recog-
nition of shared humanity. For just a brief moment, Priam and 
Achilles meet not as enemies but as fellow beings - forming, in 
White's words, "a precarious and momentary society of two in an 
alien world" (p. 53). 
What is most significant about White's reading of this moment is 
what he refuses to make out of it. The great power of Homer's poem, 
White insists, derives from the fact that the vision ultimately expressed 
is not a sentimental one. It is not as if the world itself has changed, as 
if Priam and Achilles could-walk off together into the sunset. Priam 
will carry Hector's body back to Troy, and after a decent interval the 
war and bloodshed will begin again. The peculiar power of this clos-
ing moment derives from the fact that the momentary reconciliation 
between Priam and Achilles is achieved in the context of knowing that 
war and life will go on as before (p. 54). 
The anti-sentimental or anti-utopian theme in White's reading of 
the Iliad bears stressing. The great strength of the Iliad, White insists, 
lies in its movement toward a more complex understanding of 
experience: 
The poem does not operate as a string of unconnected appeals from the 
bad to the good but as a process of statement and counterstatement, a set 
of appeals and qualifications by which one event or statement or attitude 
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is placed in a context of others; and it is through the relationships so 
established that the poem gives meaning to its material. . . . 
... In creating responses of these opposed kinds, one.after the other, 
the poet puts the reader in a position where no single response can work 
for him. [Pp. 43-44.] 
In the introductory section to this review, I spoke of the "inte-
grated ethic" that emerges from White's readings of these classics, one 
important strand of which is expressed here. The center of Homer's 
achievement, White argues, is "a kind of friendship" (p. 57), the kind 
that comes from teaching and learning how to get on in a complex 
world. Homer's poem does not offer a theoretical or ideological "sys-
tem" for dealing with experience, but something ultimately much 
more valuable. It teaches us by its own performance what is required 
for "imaginative disengagement" (p. 57) from one's inherited culture, 
and what is involved in "exten[sion of] sympathy" (p. 57). The great 
strength of the poem is that it does not hold out the prospect of a 
utopian world where one day all our problems will be solved, but 
rather seeks to instruct us in how to get on in a world where the "uni-
versal vision" of shared humanity can ever at most be imperfectly at-
tained, where learning will be followed by forgetting (p. 58). The 
movement of the Iliad, in the end, is from a simple to a complex ap-
preciation of the conditions of our existence and of possibilities for 
response. 
2. Thucydides' History: The Disintegrative Consequences of 
Adopting an Exclusive Rhetoric of Expediency and Self-
Interest 
Thucydides' History of the Pe/oponnesian War can be seen as the 
story of how "words lost their meaning" as Athens came increasingly 
to embrace the exclusive rhetoric of expediency and self-interest, and 
of the tragic consequences of this development for Athenian character 
and culture. White's chapter on the History is a searching effort to 
understand what Thucydides has to tell us about the complex dynamic 
of reciprocity that exists between the rhetoric of a culture and the sta-
bility and vitality of the culture itself. 
The "culture of argument" (p. 59) we encounter in the early parts 
of Thucydides' History, White observes, is a relatively complex and 
sophisticated one. Our first major exposure to this rhetorical culture is 
in the Corcyrean debate. Corcyra and Corinth are engaged in a strug-
gle over control of the colony at Epidamnus, and both sides send a 
delegation to appeal for Athens' support. The arguments of both sides 
to this debate are highly sophisticated; they are centered in appeals to 
three basic values, justice, expediency, and gratitude, woven together 
to form a "highly coherent discourse" (p. 65). 
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In this context, White suggests, there is nothing inherently wrong 
with the appeals to expediency and self-interest; indeed, there is a 
sense in which such appeals serve to keep the discourse honest. They 
reflect the reality that "people are moved by self-interest, in this and 
every age, as the Athenians are here" (p. 67). What is crucial is that 
appeals to self-interest are advanced here not in isolation but in the 
context of a webwork of cultural traditions (embodying values such as 
justice, gratitude, and other community norms) which provide limita-
tion and meaning. 
As the war progresses, however, the rhetoric of self-interest, origi-
nally only one strand of a larger cultural rhetoric, becomes increas-
ingly dominant and exclusive. We watch as it grows out of control 
like a malignant tumor, destroying the surrounding tissue of the cul-
tural fabric in which we first encounter it, and consuming as it does 
the very resources that gave Athens its original vitality and character. 
A pivotal moment in this development, as White's highly percep-
tive analysis shows us, is the Mytilenian Debate. At this point in the 
war, Athens has just successfully put down a revolt by the Mytilenian 
leaders (the people themselves were not involved), and the Athenians 
are called upon in public assembly to decide what shall be done. Ini-
tially they determine to put all the adult males to death and sell the 
women and children into slavery. By the following day, however, 
there is growing sentiment that this judgment may have been too 
harsh. Thus a second assembly is called, at which Cleon and Diodotus 
stake out the two basic positions available to Athens. These two 
speeches are particularly significant, White insists, because they "de-
fine two contrasting ways in which [Athens] might conceive of herself 
and her situation, two languages of motive and value, of character and 
choice" (p. 72). 
Cleon, the first to speak, argues that Athens should stick to its 
initial determination, advocating a primitive "justice as vengeance" 
position. His argument is based, White shows us, in part on self-inter-
est and in part on an appeal to the instinct for vengeance. At the heart 
of Cleon's speech is the notion that the Athenian empire is a tyranny, 
and should not pretend to be anything else.10 In essence, Cleon invites 
his audience to jettison the inherited cultural rhetoric and the values 
10. Cleon recognizes the close interrelationship that exists between practices of reciprocity 
and the creation of conditions of equality which make genuine community possible, but the 
thrust of his argument is to deny the application of those practices here. His argument is based, 
White points out, on the view that 
the allies are permanent enemies, to be ruled by force, not members of an alliance to be 
managed through claims of justice, expediency, and gratitude. The practices of reciprocity, 
of agreement . . . about justice, indeed of compassion and gratitude, can have no place 
where one city rules the others, for those practices are all premised on equality. But Athens 
can still use a language of justice, though of a primitive kind: repayment of injury by injury. 
P. 73. 
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and traditions it embodies in favor of a primitive rhetoric of justice as 
vengeance. 
One might expect then that when Diodotus rises to speak, he will 
take the opposite course, that he will try to reintroduce the cultural 
values that Cleon has discarded. But, as White shows us, Diodotus 
explicitly rejects such an appeal and argues instead simply from con-
siderations of expediency and self-interest. It is against Athens' inter-
est to punish the people of Mytilene along with its leaders, Diodotus 
argues, because such a course "would not serve as a deterrent to keep 
others from rebellion and would in fact harden the people to continue 
with a revolt once it had begun" (p. 74). It is not simply that Di-
odotus fails to seize the occasion to reassert a complex multi-valued 
rhetoric, but that he reduces the scope of rhetorical appeal to a point 
beyond which even Cleon was not prepared to go: "Diodutus con-
cedes that arguments from justice and compassion for the Mytilenians 
are irrelevant; he rests his case solely on rationality and self-interest. 
But in this case a proper calculation of interests shows that the right 
course is the one that would usually be called merciful" (p. 74). 
Human compassion at this moment is reduced to a mere function of 
the pursuit of self-interest. 
In the end, Diodotus' argument prevails, and the Athenians send a 
ship countermanding their earlier sentence. But that does not undo 
the real damage that has been done here, White argues. For by em-
bracing Diodotus' appeal Athens has in effect collaborated in the radi-
cal contraction of her own rhetorical resources and, as a consequence, 
worked a tragic reduction in her own possibilities for justification and 
self-definition. 
To give up the practice of redressing felt injuries and the language of 
rights and wrongs, of blame and mercy, for a language of pure self-inter-
est is to give up a very great deal. Such a discourse can have no basis in 
sentiment, and no stable commitment to ideas; it must rest on what 
seems best at the moment. [P. 76.] 
Just how much Athens has lost by accepting Diodotus' position is 
brought home, White goes on to show, in the famous Melian dialogue. 
Later in the war, Athens sends an expedition to the tiny island of Me-
los. Before attacking, the Athenians invite the Melians to surrender to 
avoid the necessity of a protracted seige. When the Melians attempt to 
invoke considerations of justice, they are rudely cut off by the Atheni-
ans who insist that the language of justice is irrelevant. The Melians' 
argument that Athens should be concerned about the way her actions 
will be perceived by the larger community are also cynically dismissed. 
To the Athenians, it all comes down to the brute exercise of power. In 
the end, the Melians refuse to surrender on the grounds that to do so 
would betray deeply embedded traditions of liberty for which the city 
has stood for seven centuries. The Athenians lay siege and, after de-
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feating the Melians, kill all the adult males and sell the women and 
children into slavery. 
The lesson White draws from all of this is a provocative one. 
There are some, of course, who will read Thucydides' History as offer-
ing a simple ideological lesson: namely, that to pursue self-interest is 
by itself destructive and wrong, and that a culture based in the pursuit 
of self-interest should be replaced with an alternative culture centered 
in the radical embrace of some opposite value such as "altruism"11 or 
"solidarity" and "love."12 Such an ideological reading of the History, 
White suggests, would utterly miss the point, for the very essence of 
the friendship that Thucydides offers us in this work lies in his insis-
tence that there are no such simplistic solutions. What Thucydides 
offers, White argues, is not a system but an "education in statesman-
ship" (p. 88). 
At the very heart of that education lies a critically important in-
sight into the way language operates in a stable culture. A sound and 
vital culture, Thucydides suggests, cannot be based on the radical em-
brace of any particular value or set of values. A stable culture (like a 
stable ecological system) has to be a complex one, in which contrary 
or opposed values and impulses must exist suspended as it were in a 
kind of perpetual "tension" (p. 91). This complexity must be reflected 
in the cultural rhetoric as well, since the integrity and stability of the 
one is ultimately dependent upon the integrity and stability of the 
other. What Thucydides ultimately teaches us, White argues, is that 
"it is as irrational to speak of self-interest without recognizing the 
claims of justice as it is to speak of justice without recognizing the 
claims of self-interest" (p. 91). The claims of both must exist in a 
relationship of mutual reciprocity: 
Justice and self-interest can . . . be seen as two sides of the same thing, 
as topics each of which necessarily implies the existence and validity of 
the other (as "form and substance" do, or "straight and curved"). There 
is a structural tension between them and a temptation to abandon one in 
favor of the other . . . . But it is only in the tension between them that 
a coherent world of social action and meaning can be made. It is that 
tension - that reciprocal recognition of claim and limit - that makes 
possible the adjustments by which a culture can change without collaps-
ing. [P. 91.] 
11. For a discussion of individualism versus altruism as a basis for a legal and social order, 
see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976). 
Kennedy has since "recanted" this dichotomy. See Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 5, at 36. 
12. This describes the essential thrust of Roberto Unger's anti-liberal jurisprudence, R. UN-
GER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs (1975), see text at notes 35-55 infra, and something like this 
vision is implicit in Morton Horwitz's anti-liberal historiography, M. HORWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1978). The same idea is reflected in writings of 
others allied with or sympathetic to the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, e.g., Sparer, Fun-
damental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509, 549-50 (1984) (supporting "radical 
transformation" of society to one centered in "love, trust, and support of others"). 
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3. Plato's Gorgias: Forging an Ethically Integrated Rhetoric 
Plato's Gorgias plays an extremely important role in White's work 
because it is grounded in the insistence that the ethical integration of 
language is essential to the achievement of integrity of self. The other 
two Greek texts are also concerned with relationship between lan-
guage and character and culture, but here there is an added element of 
conscious transformation. One of Plato's great achievements in this 
work, White contends, is that he shows us how the language of one's 
culture and with it the basic relationships within that culture "can be 
consciously and deliberately changed by the individual mind" (p. 93). 
Plato's central effort in the Gorgias, White explains, is to redefine 
certain key terms of value in Greek language and culture. More spe-
cifically, it is to transform in a fundamental way the notion of what it 
means "to excel." The task Plato sets for Socrates in the dialogue is to 
take the inherited language of Greek culture in which words of "excel-
lence" were divorced from words of "virtue" and, through a dialecti-
cal process, to remake the language into one in which the achievement 
of excellence is inextricably tied to the pursuit of virtue. The task, in 
short, is to develop an ethically integrated language.13 
This chapter is significant in part because it introduces us to the 
activity of dialectic - an activity which comes to play a very impor-
tant role in White's work. Dialectic, as it is performed in the Gorgias, 
consists of two major steps. The first step is that of "refutation," the 
aim of which is to shake the interlocutor free from a comfortable or 
uncritical relationship to the language of his culture. Through a series 
of simple questions, he is first disoriented and then led to embrace 
seemingly "paradoxical" propositions. The second step involves the 
conscious "reconstitution" of language so that in the end words mean 
something quite different from that which they originally meant. The 
experience itself thus coincides with the basic pattern of experience we 
encountered in the Iliad: first there is the rejection of the existing con-
ventions of the culture, then the disorientation or confusion, and fi-
nally a reconciliation of sorts, although now on altered terms. 
The Gorgias begins with Socrates putting a series of questions to 
Gorgias, one of the leading rhetoricians of the day. Socrates is partic-
ularly concerned with the potential misuse of the power of persuasion 
- with the rhetorician's employment of rhetoric as a "hired gun" 
13. White points out that there is a sense in which Plato's struggle in the Gorgias cannot be 
understood in translation, so closely tied is it to the meaning of particular Greek terms of value: 
An English translation of this text •.. tends to have an unreal and goody-goody quality, 
which makes one wonder how the questions the dialogue addresses could possibly interest a 
serious person. In Greek, by contrast, the argument is vital and threatening, gripping the 
mind through its very language. Indeed, the reason why, in the dialogues, people turn away 
from Socrates, and why, in the world, he was killed, is not that what he says is too vapid but 
that it is too real and threatening. 
P. 96. 
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without regard to the justice or injustice of the cause being advocated. 
Socrates makes at this point a crucial distinction between rhetoric and 
dialectic. Rhetoric, he argues, involves the manipulation of the uncrit-
ical response of the audience, but dialectic creates a relationship of 
mutual trust and respect, since it invites critical response at every step 
along the way. As we proceed, however, it becomes clear that the real 
problem is not rhetoric, but rhetoric conceived in a particularly nar-
row and manipulative way. Thus when Gorgias admits it is part of his 
responsibility to teach students of rhetoric about justice, White ob-
serves, Socrates lets him off the hook since he has conceded the need 
for an ethically integrated conception of the art of rhetoric. 
As the dialogue continues, Socrates brings first Polus and then Cal-
licles to confront the unintelligibility of the manipulative and ethically 
unintegrated conception of rhetoric that each initially was prepared to 
defend. He does so in part through the assertion of a set of seemingly 
paradoxical propositions (for example, that it is better to suffer an in-
justice than to do one), which are paradoxical, White helps us to see, 
only if one comes at them from the earlier unintegrated way of or-
ganizing language and experience. If instead one adopts an ethically 
integrated approach to language and experience, these propositions 
make perfectly good sense. These paradoxes force us, if we want to 
continue to make sense of the world, to take refuge in the ethically 
integrated language reconstituted by Socrates in the course of the dia-
logue. To continue living and talking in the "old way," Socrates 
teaches, is to live in a world of internal contradictions and absurdities; 
it is to live a "discordant" life (p. 103). The dialogue ends with an 
invitation by Socrates to join with him in establishing a world where 
"rhetoric should always be used toward the end of justice, as should 
every other activity" (p. 101), and where the pursuit of excellence is 
inextricably tied by an ethically integrated language to the pursuit of 
truth. 
Plato's performance in this text is an integrative one, White 
stresses, in another sense as well. The language in which Socrates and 
his interlocutors speak is not for the most part the abstract language of 
logic or theory, but the language of ordinary discourse. 14 The dia-
logue is full of concrete and domestic imagery, and it is expressive of 
the full range of human response: humor, embarrassment, dogged-
ness, arrogance, frustration, inspiration, cleverness, the list goes on. 
Moreover, some of Socrates' most telling points are made through the 
employment of literary techniques such as his use of the famous para-
ble of the leaky jars. It is because the Gorgias proceeds in this "liter-
14. The importance of making sense out of experience in the terms of "ordinary" discourse 
forms a central theme in White's work, running from his theme-setting discussion of Thucydides' 
observation about how "words had to change their ordinary meaning," see text at note 4 supra, to 
his concluding chapter on the significance of the use of "ordinary" language as the foundation for 
our own constitutional culture. See text following note 24 infra. 
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ary" way, White suggests, that Plato is able to give expression to a 
truly integrated vision of experience he could not have reached 
through the avenue of abstract theory alone (p. 108). 
White's most provocative claim in this chapter is directly related to 
this view of the Gorgias as a literary and ethical performance rather 
than a work of theory, and it has to do with how we should deal with 
the problem of Socrates himself. Socrates is a problem in the Gorgias 
because although we cannot help but admire his mastery of dialectic, 
there are times when he leaves us feeling strangely uneasy. It is as if 
we cannot fully trust him: at times he seems to play the bully, at other 
times to get away with arguments that seem strained or phony, at still 
other times to be elusive. "[S]ome of the arguments he makes are 
plainly specious," White notes, "and others one suspects to be so" (p. 
94). What is Plato up to here? 
It is a mistake to read the Gorgias, White suggests, as if Plato and 
Socrates were interchangeable. Rather we must distinguish between 
Plato, the composer of the text, and Socrates, the performer within it. 
The proper way to regard Socrates is not as an infallible guru to whom 
we should reverentially defer, but rather as a sort of persona deployed 
by Plato in the text to train our critical and ethical capabilities. Those 
aspects of Socrates' performance that trouble us, in other words, ought 
to trouble us. The very purpose of the text - like the purpose of dia-
lectic itself - is to force us at every point to make independent critical 
judgments, not simply about the performances of Socrates' interlocu-
tors, but about Socrates' own performance as well. 
It is this idea that finally shapes White's reading of the Gorgias. 
Plato's text does not offer, White argues, some permanent set of ethi-
cal truths that we can cart away and convert to at our leisure. Rather 
it offers a real friendship by inviting us to struggle with, and some-
times against, Socrates in the pursuit of truth and justice, and in the 
activity of forging out of inherited materials an ethically integrated 
language and view of experience. The essence of this friendship is the 
active struggle that dialectic requires of the reader, for it is the struggle 
itself that in the end serves to help us develop our own capacities for 
independent critical and ethical judgment. 
Before proceeding, it is important to appreciate the extent to which 
the underlying movement of this section on the Greek texts reflects in 
amplified form the basic movement of the Iliad itself. The Iliad pro-
vides, as it were, the basic "imaginative design" that shapes not only 
the internal composition formed by White's three chapters on the 
Greek texts but the larger movement and pattern of his work. Thus 
we began this section with the Iliad, a text in which the hatred of 
Achilles and his rejection of inherited culture forms the dominant 
theme. In moving to Thucydides' History, we moved to a work that is 
centrally about the disintegration of culture and cultural rhetoric; even 
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the narrative voice employed by Thucydides in this work, White 
shows us, is not a fully integrated one. Plato's Gorgias is by contrast a 
work of friendship and reconciliation; it serves in a sense to pick up 
the pieces. It is a demonstration of possibilities for consciously trans-
forming culture through the activity of dialectic, through refutation 
and reconstitution of the key terms of value of a culture. The larger 
movement of this segment of White's work, then, is from the rejection 
and disintegration of an unstable culture to the conscious activity of 
reconstituting culture in more vital and stable terms. This basic move-
ment - from rejection to reconciliation, from anger and hatred to 
friendship - is one that, as we shall see, reflects and anticipates the 
larger movement of White's composition as a whole. 
B. The English Quartet: Elaboration and Expansion of the 
Integrative Ethic 
In his chapters on the four works from eighteenth century English 
literature - Swift's Tale of a Tub, Johnson's Rambler Essays, Aus-
ten's Emma, and Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France -
White continues the literary and ethical endeavor begun with the 
Greek texts. Themes and counterthemes introduced earlier are ampli-
fied and complicated in ways that can at most be only suggested here. 
The basic movement of these four chapters is a double one: We move 
from the world of literary fiction to the world of political reality, and 
at the same time from the expression of an ethic that has primary 
application to the community of two formed by writer and reader to 
the expression of a cultural ethos which embraces the entire political 
and cultural life of a people. 
1. Swift's Tale of a Tub: Beyond the Antithetical Organization of 
Ethical Experience 
It might seem that in moving from Plato's Gorgias to Swift's Tale 
of a Tub, we are being asked to make an arbitrary if not impossible 
leap across time and culture. But in fact, as White shows us, there are 
remarkable similarities in the operation of these two works. Like 
Plato's Gorgias, Swift's Tale is one of those texts that makes us do all 
the work, but in doing so serves to develop and refine our ethical capa-
bilities. Swift presents us in the Tale with a seemingly "mad" narrative 
which, like Plato's paradoxical propositions, we can make sense of 
only by approaching what we read from the vantage of an ethically 
sound perspective. 
The structure of Swift's Tale is complex, but at its center is an 
allegorical tale about a father and his three sons: Peter, Jack, and Mar-
tin. The narrative is interrupted by a series of digressions which deal 
with a wide range of subjects from "criticks" to "madness." The tale 
itself addresses "corruptions" in religion; the digressions, those in 
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learning. Our problem, White points out, stems from the fact that the 
entire work seems to have been written by a "mad" narrator (or sev-
eral mad narrators), and thus we can never be certain about which 
statements should be taken seriously. The basic task set for us by this 
text is to figure out where Swift himself really stands or, more accu-
rately, where we should stand. In order to make sense out of the Tale, 
we are forced to develop an ethically sound position from which to 
view it, one that will allow us to explain consistently how it is we know 
how to take any particular assertion in the text. This position, White 
shows us in a deeply illuminating analysis, is not a simple but a com-
plex one. 
One of the central problems of language and character with which 
Swift forces us to deal in the Tale is the problem of the false antithesis. 
Stated in the abstract, the problem is reflected in our tendency to re-
gard ethical experience in terms of sets of radically opposed "val-
ues." 15 The basic movement of the Tale is from a world where 
antithetical thinking of this sort still helps us make sense out of what 
we are reading to one where it no longer does. 
In the beginning of the tale, the father writes a will in which he 
leaves each of his three sons a set of clothes which "with good wear-
ing" will last them "fresh and sound" as long as they live (p. 122). 
The language of the will, White points out, is a perfect reflection of the 
character of the father: plain, simple, and direct. The will commands 
very clearly that the sons are "not to add to, or diminish from their 
Coats, one Thread" upon pain of the "greatest Penalties" (p. 122). 
As time goes on, however, "shoulder knots" come into fashion, 
and the sons, wanting to be fashionable, go to the will to see what it 
has to say about adding shoulder knots. The character of the three 
sons is reflected not simply in their inability to resist succumbing to 
passing fashions but in the way they set about circumventing the clear 
prohibitions of the will. The short of it is that they find a way to 
interpret the will that allows them to attach the shoulder knots. As 
other fashions make their appearance, the sons invoke an entire range 
of specious techniques of interpretation to allow alteration and embel-
lishment of the once simple clothes, in clear contradiction of the sim-
ple mandate of the father's will. 
Thus far, White observes, we have no difficulty in knowing what is 
good and what is bad. "Plain" represented by the father and the lan-
guage of the will is good; "fancy" represented by passing fashions and 
clever interpretation is bad. The antithetical imagination works per-
fectly well here to indicate what we should embrace and what reject. 
Therefore when we come to Swift's famous "Digression on Mad-
15. This is a distinctive characteristic of the way in which radical communitarian writers, 
such as Morton Horwitz and Roberto Unger, organize language and experience. See Teachout, 
Book Review, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241, 241-47, 272-78 (1978). 
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ness," White points out, the habits of antithetical thinking are thor-
oughly engrained. But here the narrative enters a new level of 
complication. We enter a world where the antithetical imagination 
becomes a positive hindrance as the reader enters a labyrinth of irony 
and seeming contradiction in which it is easy to become disoriented 
and lost. We have entered the "confusion" phase of our ethical educa-
tion. In order to make sense of Swift's text at this point, we are forced 
to develop a different, more refined way of organizing experience, an 
entirely new rhetoric that allows us to make the kind of literary and 
ethical distinctions that need to be made. The key to understanding 
the operation of the Digression, White shows us, is to appreciate "that 
the opposite of the false views presented here are also false" (p. 132). 
The Digression forces us to recognize that it is not the values them-
selves, or our adoption or rejection of them, that determines who we 
are, but rather the relationships we establish to them (and between or 
among them) in a particular context. The heart of ethical judgment 
lies not in choosing between contrasting values but in "the way of 
making the contrast itself" (p. 132). Thus when Swifts says 
that "Imagination is of Cuffs with the Senses" and a "man's Fancy gets 
astride on his Reason," what is wrong is not with Imagination or Sense 
or Fancy or Reason but with the relationship expressed between them: 
"at Cuffs." It would be just as bad if man's Reason got "astride" on his 
Fancy. . . . Another way to put it is to say that the questions on which 
the passage is organized are false ones: credulous vs. curious, surface vs. 
depth, truth vs. fiction, memory vs. imagination, nature vs. art, and so 
on.16 
The only way---t_o escape the trap of the "false question," White insists, 
is to change the question itself. Rather than asking whether we should 
embrace this set of values over that set of values, we must ask the 
much more difficult question of what kind of relationship we should 
establish to this or that value relative to others in this particular 
circumstance. 
This is a critical moment in White's work; implicit in it is the rejec-
tion of the ethical structure underlying much of radical communitar-
ian theory.17 To follow Swift and White at this point is to leave behind 
16. P. 132 (emphasis in original). 
17. For example, the radical communitarians posit a radical opposition between a world of 
values centered in "justice" and one centered in "efficiency." See generally Teachout, supra note 
15. As White has suggested earlier in his treatment of Thucydides' History, and as he goes on to 
elaborate in these chapters on the 18th century English texts, to think and write about the world 
of experience this way involves a "false division"; it 
is a form of disease, a division of the self and culture that amounts to a kind of madness. 
For to divide this way is to deform; it denies, by falsely resolving them, structural tensions 
that are central to human life and experience. Acceptance of them is essential to maturity 
and health. 
P. 135. This in part may explain why Morton Horwitz's historiography so consistently fails to 
do justice to the complexity of experience of both the 18th and 19th centuries. See Schwartz, Tort 
Law and The Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 
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"systems" ethics, in particular those based on antithetical embrace of 
value, and enter a world where the development and employment of 
discriminating judgment is essential. And that, White argues, is ulti-
mately the only basis for a sound ethic: 
Our experience of this text thus teaches that the tension between the 
imagination and fancy and wit, on the one hand, and plain and direct 
speech on the other, which here is presented with such extraordinary 
fullness, cannot be resolved by a choice of one thing over the other but 
only by learning to live with both. The imagination is as necessary to 
ward off the madness of pure rationality as reason is to ward off that of 
pure fantasy; either one alone, like '~ustice" or "expediency" in Thucyd-
ides, is a delusion that denies the truth. ts 
Swift's Tale, White argues in conclusion, brings us to appreciate 
with new immediacy the critical linkages that exist between language 
and character. Even beyond this, the experience of the text itself offers 
a special kind of ethical training: 
Just as the Tale is dialectical in the responsibility it places upon the 
reader, it is ethical in its central concern with character. . . . [T]o read 
it at all one must constantly be assessing character as it is manifested in 
language. The defects that appear in the text as delusion, false questions; 
withdrawals from reality, unlimited ambitions, failures to connect, and 
the like are not merely intellectual or cognitive deficiencies but diseases 
of character, the only remedy for which is the kind of wholeness and 
health Swift seeks to stimulate in the reader. To read sensibly, to write 
sensibly, and to be sensible are, for Swift, intimately connected. [P. 136.] 
This kind of ethical training, White maintains, is Swift's "greatest gift" 
to the reader: "Anyone who reads the Tale well will be forever differ-
ent, alert in new ways to faults and defects of the self as they exhibit 
themselves in speech or writing" (p. 136). 
2. Johnson's Rambler Essays: The Ethical Imagination in 
Performance 
Johnson's central concern in the Rambler essays is essentially the 
same as Swift's in the Tale: it is with expressing and shaping character 
through the activity of writing and reading. Unlike Swift, however, 
Johnson does not send his reader out into a maze or minefield of irony 
and parody, but rather does the labor himself. In doing so, Johnson 
demonstrates certain critical and ethical capacities that form major 
strands of the ethic to which White himself ultimately gives 
expression. 
On the surface, Johnson's Rambler essays are a series of "moral" 
essays, but if we read them simply for the paraphrasable moral lesson 
at the end, White warns, we will miss the most valuable thing they 
(1981); Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. RBv. 533 
(1979). 
18. Pp. 134-35 (footnote omitted). 
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have to offer. For the heart of these essays lies, he argues, in the rec-
ord they provide of Johnson's own struggle to make sense out of the 
world, to push beyond platitude and commonplace toward the expres-
sion of more fundamental and stable truths. What we should look for 
when we read Johnson's essays, in other words, is not a transportable 
set of moral truths but the reflection of the ethical imagination in 
performance. 
In Johnson's world as in our own, White observes, one conse-
quence of the fact that language is common property is that both lan-
guage and the truth it expresses are constantly subject to "pressures 
toward thoughtlessness" (p. 144). Any statement of truth, no matter 
once how vital, will tend to become vitiated, drained of impact and 
meaning as a result of the wear and tear of constant use and misuse. 
Our task, therefore, is the endless one of rescuing such truths from the 
condition into which they have fallen. 
Perhaps the most significant characteristic of the ethical language 
that Johnson carves out in these essays is its open-endedness. This, to 
White, is a powerful and underappreciated virtue. When we look at 
Johnson's essays as a whole, White argues, what is most noticeable is 
the extent to which the conclusions reached in any particular essay 
"are themselves subject to reexamination and complication, to a fur-
ther process of thought; they are not offered as building blocks of a 
theoretical system" (pp. 152-53). A central virtue of the ethical lan-
guage that Johnson adopts, then, is that it serves to remind us of the 
"precariousness" of truth (p. 153). 
Johnson's achievement in the Rambler essays is to make out of 
"inherited materials a moral language of extraordinary range, discrim-
ination, and coherence" (p. 163). The heart of the education provided 
by these essays lies in the encounters they offer with certain critically 
important character-shaping ."activities of mind" that 
comprise a steady pressure to correct and complicate; a constant open-
ness to new facts or ideas; a repeated turning from system or theory to 
experience; and a hunger for balance, for the capaciousness of mind that 
can retain at once two opposing tendencies in their full force. 19 
It is from observing these aspects of Johnson's language in action that 
we can learn the most, White suggests. And it is these capacities -
the "steady pressure to correct and complicate"; the "openness"; the 
turning from "theory to experience"; the "hunger for balance" and the 
"capaciousness of a mind that can retain at once two opposing tenden-
cies in their full force" - that are in the end absolutely essential to the 
establishment of a sound ethic for self and culture. Johnson's Rambler 
Essays expand our sense of ethical possibilities by demonstrating the 
integrative potential of the discriminating and complicating 
imagination. 
19. P. 152 (footnote omitted). 
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3. Austen's Emma· Toward the Creation of a World with an 
Ethical Center in Friendship 
Austen's Emma is the story of the education of a young woman 
who, through a series of encounters, is gradually led from a sentimen-
tal to a more complex way of making sense of her life. The novel itself 
is a rich and subtle exploration of the relationship between language 
and character and, like most of the other works considered so far, 
moves toward the development of a truly integrated way of talking 
about and making sense out of the world. 
The characters who are the objects of Emma's affection in the 
opening moments of the novel, White points out, represent in one way 
or another the sentimental ethic. There is, for example, Emma's "af-
fectionate, indulgent" father (p. 165), and Miss Taylor, her governess,, 
"who had such affection as could never find fault. "20 Emma's own 
relationship to such characters is also governed by sentimentality. In 
a sense, these characters are embodiments of a particular aspect of her 
own character, which they bring out in her dealings with them. 
Here, as in the other works we have considered, there is an inti-
mate relationship between language and character. Who one is -
what one's ethical possibilities are - is vitally determined by how one 
uses words. Indeed, as we become familiar with the way Austen's 
novel operates, it becomes possible to recognize the distinct ethical 
"voices" represented by each of the characters in their every gesture 
and in every nuance of speech. 
White shows us how this works in the way Emma uses language in 
the early moments of the novel. In her internal reveries and conversa-
tions with others, Emma puts "affection" and "fondness" on one side 
of the ethical fence, and "restraint" and "authority" on the other (p. 
165). Emma's is a world, in other words, in which value terms such as 
these are placed in a simplistic opposition, the one set of terms being 
"good," the other "bad" - a condition, as we have seen, that makes 
the development of a truly coherent understanding of experience im-
possible. "Friendship" at this point in Emma's development is 
equivalent to "affection," and "affection" cannot be distinguished 
from "indulgence." A friend is what Miss Taylor is to Emma: it is one 
who has "such affection as could never find fault." What is wrong 
with such language, White explains, "is that it has no internal opposi-
tion, no tension to give it life and to make meaning possible. The 
terms just run into one another without contrast or definition" (p. 
166). The language lacks "the contrasting other term that makes 
thought possible" (p. 166). 
As the novel proceeds, White shows us, Emma gradually comes to 
develop a more critical and complex way of thinking and talking about 
20. P. 166 (quoting J. AUSTEN, EMMA 6 (R. Chapman ed. 3d ed. 1933)). 
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herself and othei:s. Her education is formed in part through a series of 
painful and embarrassing encounters, and in part through her develop-
ing relationship with Mr. K.nightley. If Emma sometimes seems to 
represent imagination insufficiently grounded in judgment, Mr. 
K.nightley can be seen to represent the opposite tendency. The rela-
tionship between these two develops largely through a series of conver-
sations in which Mr. K.nightley often plays the critical role, and 
Emma the playful spirit. As White points out, both Mr. K.nightley 
and Emma learn from these conversations. Emma's freshness and 
playful intelligence draw K.nightley out of what one suspects might 
otherwise have become a settled condition, and K.nightley teaches 
Emma that a large part of friendship is learning not only how to be 
critical but how to take the criticism of others as well. White gives 
great stress to the critical role played by friendship in Emma's literary 
and ethical development: 
Emma learns not so much from her errors as from her experience of 
becoming, in conversation with another, an improved version of herself. 
The movement of the novel is thus only partly the correction of error 
through experience; it is more deeply the development of self through 
friendship. [P. 184.] 
By the end of the novel, Emma has left behind her earlier tendency 
to utopian reverie and fantasy, and the sentimental and manipulative 
language with which she gave it expression, to confront reality in all 
its problematic complexity. Her language has changed as well: no 
longer is it sentimental, but a language, in White's terms, "congruent 
with the essential conditions of her existence" {p. 189). Emma's lan-
guage "has become both a way of directly facing circumstances that 
cannot be changed . . . and a way of making a better world upon 
them if the opportunity offers" {p. 189). The novel closes with the 
coming together of Emma and Mr. K.nightley - the union of imagina-
tion and judgment in a relationship of critical friendship that is matur-
ing into love. 
In this novel a number of themes important to the development of 
White's ethical vision and the composition of his own work converge: 
the view that ethical development takes the form of the movement 
toward a more complex and integrated way of thinking and talking 
about experience; the idea of an ethic centered in a relationship of crit-
ical friendship; and the notion that the conversational form represents 
important possibilities for ethical development. 
4. Burke's Reflections: The "Compositional" Versus the 
"Theoretical" Organization of Language and Experience 
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France represents an ex-
pansion of the sphere of the ethically integrated perspective to em-
brace the political and cultural life of a people. It plays in this respect 
a critical transitional role in White's work because it carries us from 
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the world of fiction into the world of political reality and action. 
Burke's is a remarkable achievement in many respects, White makes 
us see, but chief among them is the capacity of the rhetoric he carves 
out to pull into an integrated perspective not only the complex aspects 
of individual character, but those aspects as they are reflected in the 
character of an entire culture. White's analysis of the interrelation-
ships between Burke's integrative vision of English constitutionalism 
and the way in which Burke's work itself functions as an integrative 
composition brings us to appreciate Burke's real achievement in this 
work. 
One important aspect of Burke's performance, White argues, is his 
insistence upon developing an ethical language in which terms of value 
(such as "liberty") are regarded "not in isolation or abstraction," nor 
in a relationship of simplistic opposition to other terms, but in "combi-
nation" (p. 200). When Burke is asked, for example, whether or not 
he is for "liberty," he responds as follows: 
I cannot stand forward, and give praise or blame to any thing which 
relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the 
object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and 
solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances . . . give in reality 
to every political principle its distinguishing colour, and discriminating 
effect. The circumstances are what render every civil and political 
scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind. . . . 
. . . I should therefore suspend my congratulations on the new lib-
erty of France, until I was informed how it had been combined with 
government; with public force; with armies; with the collection of an 
effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with 
the solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and social man-
ners. [P. 200.] 
Burke's development of a complex ethical discourse of "combination" 
is extremely important to White, because in his view it is the only type 
of ethical discourse that can provide a foundation for a stable culture. 
Burke is right, White insists, to refuse "to use 'liberty' as a single un-
qualified term of praise or blame. . . . The real task is not the isolated 
definition of values but their combination, their composition into a 
whole" (p. 201). 
White goes on to show us how Burke's central activity in the Re-
flections is the elaboration of two different cultures, each of which epit-
omizes a particular way of organizing language and experience. On 
the one hand there is the culture of the English Constitution, which 
embodies the compositional ethic of uniting "into a consistent whole 
the various anomalies and contending principles that are found in the 
minds and affairs of men."21 On the other, there is the culture of the 
21. P. 201 (quoting E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION JN FRANCE AND ON 
THE PROCEEDINGS JN CERTAIN SOCIETIES JN LoNDON RELATIVE TO THAT EVENT 89-91 (C. 
O'Brien ed. 1969)). 
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French Revolution, which is based upon a theoretical approach to ex-
perience and is disintegrative in thrust (p. 201). At the heart of the 
differences between these two cultures, White explains, lie very differ-
ent approaches to the organization of language: 
a difficult and comprehensive language of combination and composition, 
which offers a way of putting things together into a whole, a way of 
constituting a culture and a community; and an easy language of theory 
and abstraction, which offers a way of taking things apart, a way of un-
doing order, which leads at last to chaos. The French process is dissolu-
tion; the British process - enacted for us in the composition of this text 
- is constitution. [Pp. 201-02.] 
Burke does not simply advocate the advantages of the composi-
tional ethic of English constitutionalism, White points out, he per-
forms that ethic at every level of his own work. The "central 
characteristic" of the language Burke employs, White argues 
is its integrative force: it is a language that unites fact, value, and reason; 
thought and emotion; the family and the crown; the social and the natu-
ral worlds; ethical motives and material results. It has an inte~ive 
force not only in the political and social world but in the reader him-
self .... [P. 208.] 
All of this is not to say that White takes an uncritical view of the 
vision of the social and political order that Burke ultimately expresses. 
Indeed, White argues that Burke's vision is "radically flawed" because 
it is "founded on inequality of an essential sort" (p. 228). And Burke's 
own performance is flawed in a parallel way: at times he seems to 
engage in rhetorical domination of the reader in a way, White sug-
gests, that is fundamentally inconsistent with a relationship of mutual 
trust and respect. Unlike dialectic as it is performed in Plato's Gor-
gias, Burke's rhetoric neither presupposes nor serves to establish con-
ditions of essential equality (p. 228). 
Notwithstanding these defects, White argues, Burke's text offers an 
extraordinary education. Among other things, it teaches us that if we 
are serious about developing an ethically integrated view of self and 
culture, the language we use must be adequate to the task. The lan-
guage we employ, White argues, 
must be what I have called literary - merging fact, value, and reason, 
fusing the particular and the general, uniting thought and emotion, logic 
and image - rather than theoretical or conceptual. [P. 229.] 
Burke's text also teaches the crucial importance of taking a "com-
plete" view of experience. When we are reading a text, for example, 
taking a "complete" view means looking beyond surface statement to 
understand how the work operates as a complete performance. That 
same endeavor should govern our approach to experience generally. 
Burke ultimately teaches us, White argues, that to understand the 
"full meaning" of an event 
one must see it also from the point of view of those who are gone and 
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those yet to come. At each stage the central idea is that of completeness: 
the constitution is not the theory, the abstraction, but the complete way 
of life; the individual is not to be ... spoken to ... as a merely political 
or merely intellectual or merely emotional creature but as a complete 
person, knowing all that he knows, doing all that he does . . . . [P. 
229.] 
In the next and final section of his book, White explores the employ-
ment of this complex cultural art in the context of the real world activ-
ity of establishing an American constitution. 
C. Three American Documents: Establishing a Constitutional 
Discourse in the Real World 
White's chapter on the three documents from the early American 
constitutional experience is perhaps the most provocative in his 
book. 22 The idea of the chapter is a fascinating one. White brings to 
bear on three public documents from this early period of American 
constitutionalism - the Declaration of Independence, the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. 
Maryland 23 - the same method of analysis and the same critical per-
spective he has employed in reading the works of imaginative litera-
ture we have considered so far. In terms of the larger structure of his 
work, this chapter continues the movement begun with Burke's Re-
flections from the world of "fiction" into the world of political and 
legal reality, from the world of reflection into the world of action. It 
serves in a sense to make operational the ethical vision that White has 
developed so far largely in the context of imaginative literature. It is 
clear from everything that has come before that White could not sim-
ply stop with Burke's Reflections because the world Burke envisions is 
ultimately one based on conditions of fundamental inequality. And 
such conditions, White shows us, can never provide the foundation for 
a truly stable culture. Thus, moving from Burke's world to the world 
of the American constitutional experiment is important because the 
idea of equality, however imperfectly it was realized at the time, was at 
least a central shaping idea in the American experience. 
White views these three American "constitutional" documents not 
22. And the most problematic one. In my view this chapter is the least successful chapter in 
White's book. Exactly why this is so, I am not entirely sure, but it has in part to do with the fact 
that White attempts to compress far too much here into a very restricted space. The result is 
that, for all its interest, his treatment of American documents tends to be somewhat fragmented 
and superficial, and his suggestions about application of the education we have undergone to the 
actual practice of law so condensed that they are almost obscure. This would be of much greater 
concern if White had not demonstrated elsewhere the deep relevance of this kind of education to 
the understanding and practice oflaw. See J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); White, 
supra note 3. One should take White's final chapter for what it is intended to be: not as a 
detailed elaboration of how one might apply the education we have undertaken to the study and 
practice of law, but rather as a window that opens upon a set of unrealized possibilities. 
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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as isolated events, but as forming together a significant pattern: we 
move from the "unstable constitution" represented by the Declaration 
of Independence (p. 231), to the "stable but inert" framework pro-
vided by the Constitution itself (p. 240), and finally, in Marshall's 
opinion in McCulloch, to the establishment of an integrated and vital 
constitutional community. 
The Declaration of Independence could never provide the founda-
tion for a stable culture, White argues. The instability of the world to 
which the Declaration gives expression is reflected in the almost schiz-
ophrenic division of "voices" in the document. In the opening 
passages we encounter the voice of prudence and moderation and high 
principle, but that gives way in the central "indictment" section to the 
voice of hatred and patriotic fervor.24 Nowhere in the document, 
moreover, are these two voices fully reconciled or integrated. 
At the same time, White recognizes that the Declaration does very 
successfully what it sets out to do; it moves the reader, without his 
ever fully realizing what is happening, "from his ordinary state of con-
sciousness . . . into a willingness to pledge his all in a battle to save 
the country it has defined as his" (p. 239). But it does not offer "a 
basis on which to found a collective life more complex than that of 
national self-defense" (p. 239). 
The Constitution, White argues, serves to do what the Declaration 
"neither attempted nor achieved: to establish and organize a national 
community not merely at a transcendent moment of crisis but in its 
ordinary existence and over time" (p. 240). In describing the structure 
and operation of the Constitution, White attaches great significance to 
the fact that its basic "rhetorical character" is like that of a trust: in 
certain respects it is very specific in the directives it provides, but in 
others it places "complete confidence in others to do what should be 
done" (p. 244). It is helpful in this respect, White suggests, to think of 
the Constitution as establishing a "rhetorical community" (p. 246). It 
not only defines the large terms upon which future constitutional con-
versations will proceed, but also sets forth the occasions that will give 
rise to such conversations and identifies who the responsible speakers 
will be. Yet, for all of this, the Constitution is "by its very nature 
lifeless and inert unless it is put to work . . . by the citizens who live 
under it" (p. 247). 
The creation of a viable constitutional community itself cannot be 
achieved, White insists, without the participation of the Court. That is 
because "the Court can offer what no other branch can: the develop-
ment, over time, of a self-reflective, self-corrective body of discourse 
that will bind its audience together by engaging them in a common 
24. See p. 236. There is a sense in which the Declaration of Independence can be seen to 
replicate in the American experience Achilles' angry departure from the community of Achean 
warriors. 
876 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:849 
language and a common set of practices." [P. 251.] The "character" 
of the language of constitutional discourse established by the Court 
thus becomes crucial, for it determines in the most fundamental way 
the character of the constitutional community itself. 
This is where Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland holds 
such special attraction for White: Marshall in this opinion expresses a 
view of constitutional language that reflects a truly complex apprecia-
tion of the nature of language itself. In a classic passage on how to 
read the "necessary and proper clause," Marshall sets out his view of 
the nature of constitutional rhetoric: 
Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the 
mind, in all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is more com-
mon than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositions 
contain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a 
meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It is essential 
to just construction, that many words which import something excessive, 
should be understood in a more mitigated sense - in that sense which 
common usage justifies. The word "necessary" is of this description. It 
has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of 
comparison; and it is often connected with other words, which increase 
or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. 
[P. 259.] 
Marshall adopts here the view of language that lies at the heart of the 
literary ethic which has gradually emerged from White's reading of 
these classics. Marshall aligns the activity of constitutional argument 
and decision with the classic traditions we have been considering. He 
"defines the language of the Constitution," White claims, "as continu-
ous with ordinary language and capable of the same richness, com-
plexity, and variation - indeed, of the same capacity for 
inconsistency" (p. 260). This has enormous significance because it 
means the language of our constitutional discourse will be, in the sense 
in which we have developed those terms, "literary" and not "theoreti-
cal" (p. 260). What Marshall has done, of course, is not to end the 
constitutional conversation, but to establish the terms on which it will 
proceed. His opinion recognizes that the process of constitution and 
reconstitution will be carried on by others, including ourselves. 
In a closing section, White considers the ethical possibilities that 
are opened up by the texts we have been considering for the modern 
lawyer. The lawyer is in a unique position, he suggests, to transform 
culture by forging out of inherited materials a more complex and inte-
grated vision of human possibilities. In this sense, the lawyer's central 
endeavor is not very different from that of the writers we have been 
considering. Moreover, there are important similarities between the 
activity in which lawyers engage in presenting and developing a case 
and the operation of dialectic. Both processes involve the activities of 
refutation and reconstitution, and both require the essential equality of 
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the participants if the process is to work. White is careful to point out, 
however, that he is neither describing nor attempting to justify "the 
actual operation and effect of our legal system, let alone our economic 
system, both of which in fact suffer from disgraceful injustices" (p. 
274). Rather, his intention is "to suggest a set of possibilities implicit 
in the institution and its practices, to define the kind of aim that the 
lawyer can have for himself" (p. 274). This is where White's book 
ends: not with a system, but with a "set of possibilities." 
We end up in this book a little like Huckleberry Finn at the end of 
his journey in Twain's novel. For if we put away for the moment con-
cern with detail and ask the large question of where we have come in 
this extraordinary work, it is in such terms that we would have to 
describe our journey. We have come, in essence, from our origins as a 
civilization down the great river, through encounter and struggle, mis-
take and correction, to that moment when we have arrived in the new 
world, not at the end of our journey, but like Huck lighting out "for 
the territories," free to start all over. But we are free in an even 
greater sense because of the work and the struggle of those who have 
come before. We end not with Descartes, ready to raze everything to 
the ground and start from scratch, but with Burke and his deep sense 
of how much we owe to our traditions. We are left at the end of 
White's work, it is important to see, not locked into an ideological 
system but released, as it were, on our own. But if we are on our own, 
we are also, paradoxically, part of a larger community. We are central 
participants in the on-going cultural endeavor of forging out of inher-
ited materials a constantly renewed vision of human possibilities - of 
reconstituting language and culture, as Plato would say, "always 
toward the end of justice" (p. 101). 
II. THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF WHITE'S WHEN WORDS 
LOSE THEIR MEANING 
Contemporary jurisprudential literature proceeds in large part 
upon two commonly held assumptions: first, that if we are serious 
about developing a "coherent" or "integrated" view of law in culture, 
we must resort to theory;25 second, that within the realm of theory it 
ultimately comes down to a choice between two competing grand ide-
25. If there is an ideejixe around which the current generation oflegal scholars has gathered, 
it is that truly serious discourse about the law must take the form of theory - indeed, that the 
most important truths are those that lend themselves to expression in theoretical terms. See, e.g., 
Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE PoLmcs OF LA w: A PROGRESSIVE CRI-
TIQUE 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law 
School as University, 33 J. LEGAL En. 437 (1983). This basic assumption seems to have gained 
uncritical acceptance across the entire academic and ideological spectrum. 
At one end of the spectrum are the market ideologues. For example, Richard Posner has 
advocated transforming traditional common law discourse into the language of economic theory 
on the ground that such a development will lead to the development of an internally coherent 
body of jurisprudence. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Posner, Eco-
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ologies: market ideology on the one hand and radical communitarian 
ideology on the other.26 White's book calls into fundamental question 
both of these assumptions. 
One cannot express a truly integrated view of the world, White 
insists, in the language of theory, and without such a view it is impos-
sible to establish the conditions that make genuine community possi-
ble. The development and expression of an integrative ethic for self 
and culture calls upon a much more complex compositional activity of 
the sort performed in the works of imaginative literature we have been 
considering. What these works offer is not a "system" or a fixed set of 
ideological truths, but a series of ethical performances from which we 
can learn a great deal. They offer an education in the "cultural art" of 
constitution (p. 229) - a difficult and creative art that calls upon 
every resource of judgment and imagination. 
To understand the significance of White's book, it is necessary to 
understand the meaning he gives to two central terms: "integrated" 
and "community." "Integrated," it is clear, is something radically dif-
ferent from what the economic theorists intend when they talk about 
"internal coherence" and from what the communitarian theorists en-
vision when they refer to an "integrated" ideology. And the "commu-
nity" that is performed in White's work is of altogether a different 
character from that which we encounter in the literature of the radical 
communitarian writers. Understanding what these terms mean as 
they are performed here is critical because the whole movement of 
White's book is in a sense toward the expression of an integrated view 
of the world and, simultaneously, the establishment of conditions that 
make genuine community possible. 
nomics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982). 
At the other end of the spectrum are the radical communitarian (or "anti·liberal") theorists. 
This group includes those who believe that the rise of "classical liberal" theory (in this context, 
market theory) has led to the disintegration of self and community, and that only some form of 
communitarian theory can restore a truly integrated sense of self and culture. This group in-
cludes a core of radical communitarians, see M. HORWITZ, supra note 12; R. UNGER, KNOWL-
EDGE AND PoLmcs (1975), and a larger and more diffuse group of anti-liberal scholars who 
cluster under the heading of Critical Legal Studies theorists. See Critical Legal Studies Sympo-
sium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
At the middle of the spectrum are those who look to theory to provide a coherence felt to be 
lacking in the traditional approach. Frank Michelman seems to use "theory" in a very broad 
sense to include all extralegal disciplinary perspectives on the law, but it is significant neverthe-
less that he tends to view such perspectives as at the core "theoretical" ones. See Michelman, 
The Parts and the Whole: Non-Euclidean Curricular Geometry, 32 J. LEGAL ED. 352, 353 
(1982). Bruce Ackerman would draw a brighter line between non-theoretical modes of discourse 
and theoretical ones, and clearly sees great significance in the shift in legal discourse to the 
theoretical mode. See B. ACKERMAN, RECONSfRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984); SOCIAL Jus-
TICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); 
Ackerman, Four Questions/or Legal Theory, in PROPERTY 351 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.) 
(Nomos No. 22, 1980). 
26. See, e.g., Tushnet, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 696 (1980) (The "central issue 
in political philosophy today" is "which social-economic system, capitalism or socialism, justice 
demands."). 
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A. Patterns of Meaning 
If there is any one lesson to be taken from White's book, it is that 
to discern the true meaning of a work we must attend not simply to 
surface statement but to the work as a complete performance. We 
must seek the vision that is performed, not just in the claims that are 
made and in the "ideas" that are expressed, but in the way words are 
used, in the way sentences and paragraphs are put together, and in the 
larger movement and pattern of the work as a composition - in short 
in the work's imaginative design. 
What is it possible to say about the "meaning" of White's own 
work if we approach it from this perspective? I suggested at the outset 
that the basic structure of White's work is in some respects like that of 
a picaresque novel.27 It is so both in that our central experience in this 
work involves a passage or journey through a series of distinct worlds, 
each of which forms an essential link in our overall ethical education, 
and in that we do not end up in a particular world or community but 
are left to continue our ethical journey, somehow better prepared to do 
so by the education we have acquired. 
There is a real difficulty in talking about an ethical vision that as-
sumes this particular form, because if we talk about it as an internally 
coherent "system" or "body of thought," that critical element of open-
endedness recedes into the background, yet if we stress the open-en-
dedness then we fail to do justice to the fact that what we are dealing 
with is a coherent and describable vision with its own deep integrity. 
White's version of the world, in other words, is in certain important 
respects like Burke's. While there may lie buried deep within White's 
performance here something that might be called an "ethical system," 
the chances of extracting it in that form are slight. But, by the same 
token, to treat that performance simply as a group of ad hoc percep-
tions would utterly fail to recognize the coherence of the vision ex-
pressed. What Chapman said of Burke applies, I think, with almost 
equal force to White in this respect. He belongs to a great English 
tradition of "amphibious" writers, Chapman said: "poetically open in 
his thinking, broadly practical in his poetry, whose diffuse and many-
mansioned thought seems always implicit with a coherent and syn-
thetic system which, however, is never achieved."28 And, as an essen-
tial aspect of his vision of the world, can never be achieved, at least not 
in any final sense. 
If the organization of White's work resembles that of a picaresque 
novel, it also falls into the classic pattern of dialectic. This happens 
actually at two levels. Not only can one clearly discern in White's 
reading of each of the classics the major phases of dialectic as it is 
27. See text at note 7 supra. 
28. G. CHAPMAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE PRACTICAL IMAGINATION 1 (1967). 
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classically performed, with a "refutation" phase, a "paradoxical" 
phase, and a "reconstitution" of the world on permanently altered 
terms, but the classic pattern of dialectic shapes the overall design of 
White's work as well. It is not accidental in this respect that in the 
first two works we encounter, Homer's Iliad and Thucydides' History, 
the dominant impulses are those of instability, disintegration and re-
jection, coinciding with the "refutation" phase of dialectic. As we 
move into Plato's Gorgias and Swift's Tale, we move into a world in 
which the dominant note is that of confusion; our central experience 
here is the kind of disorientation that the paradoxical phase of dialec-
tic is designed to produce. It is only when we reach Johnson's Ram-
bler Essays that we begin to sense that the world is being put back 
together again, although now in newly reconstituted terms. And this 
activity of "reconstitution" becomes an increasingly significant aspect 
of our experience as we proceed first to Austen's Emma, then to 
Burke's Reflections, where "constitution" is not only the central theme 
but also a central aspect of Burke's own performance, and finally to 
the "real world" activity of establishing a constitution in White's 
chapter on the American constitutional experience. 
Thus when we get to that point in his argument where White de-
fines the responsibility of the lawyer in essentially dialectical terms -
where he claims that our central role is to take the inherited materials 
of our culture and reconstitute them in this dialectical way - we know 
what he means in part because he has exposed us to a series of classic 
performances in dialectic, and also because he himself has performed 
dialectic in the large patterns of his own composition. 
Neither "dialectic" nor "reconstitution," as they are used here, are 
content-empty terms to be filled up willy-nilly however we please. As 
White's chapter on the Gorgias demonstrates, the very employment of 
dialectic implies a commitment to the kind of relationship dialectic 
requires for its successful operation: that of mutual trust and respect. 
Inherent in the choice of form is a commitment to a substantive vision 
of human relationships in which equality, autonomy, and a sense of 
shared endeavor are key .elements. 
By the time we are through with White's work we have a very 
definite, although complex, understanding of what the term "reconsti-
tution" means, not as supplied by a dictionary, but from the actual 
performances of reconstitution we have witnessed. It is, for example, 
what Homer does in the Iliad when he moves from a simple to a more 
complex understanding of the human predicament and of possibilities 
for self and community. It is what Austen does when she carries us 
from a world characterized by the sentimental organization of lan-
guage and experience into a world in which a more complex organiza-
tion of these things opens up possibilities for genuine friendship and 
community. It is what Burke does, almost heroically, in the Re.flee-
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tions, when he carves out that highly complex and deeply integrative 
vision of English constitutionalism which embraces virtually every as-
pect and level and dimension of human experience. 
If each of these performances by itself represents a complex 
achievement from which we can learn a great deal, together they open 
up an almost staggeringly rich set of possibilities for reconstituting our 
language and our world. What they all share in common is a move-
ment toward a more complex and integrated organization of language 
and experience. And it is that movement that defines, at least at the 
level of lowest common denominator, what reconstitution of one's 
world "means" in this work. 
B. The "Coherence" of Radical Economic Theory as a Force for 
Disintegration 
It is critically important to see that what is meant by an "inte-
grated vision of experience" here is not at all the same as "internal 
coherence of theory." Indeed, as White's reading of Burke's Reflec-
tions suggests, the attempt to reduce experience to the terms of inter-
nally coherent theory may actually create a force for disintegration. 
Let me illustrate this point by drawing on an example from contempo-
rary jurisprudence, from the writings of Professor (now Judge) Posner, 
who is generally recognized as one of the leading figures in the law-
and-economics movement. The thrust of Professor Posner's jurispru-
dence is to take the experience-based, tradition-looking, and ethically 
complex language of the common law and transform it into the inter-
nally coherent language of economic theory.29 His effort has been to 
effect a radical transformation of inherited legal language into the 
terms of the utilitarian cost-benefit calculus. While such a transforma-
tion may seem to yield a kind of clean internal coherence that the 
traditional approach does not offer, it also exerts, I think it can be 
shown, a very real disintegrative pressure. The impulse we see at work 
in Posner's writing is in a sense the exact opposite of that reflected in 
Plato's Gorgias. Plato's struggle in the Gorgias, it will be recalled, was 
to take an inherited cultural rhetoric in which terms of excellence were 
unrelated to terms of ethical virtue and to forge out of those inherited 
materials an ethically integrated rhetoric. In Posner's writings the ef-
fort is just the opposite: it is to take an inherited cultural rhetoric that 
to a certain extent is already ethically integrated and subject it to the 
disintegrative pressures of radical market theory. Perhaps what char-
acterizes Posner's organization of language and experience more than 
anything else is, first, the radical separation of terms of traditional eth-
ical judgment from considerations of what is efficient or expedient and, 
29. See note 25 supra. 
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second, the elevation of considerations of expediency to a position of 
dominating relevance. 
The disintegrative consequences of talking and thinking about the 
world in this way are at least partially revealed in Professor Posner's 
discussion of the old English case of Bird v. Holbrook30 in his famous 
"spring-gun" article.31 A boy is seriously maimed by a spring-gun 
when he innocently climbs over a garden wall to retrieve a stray pea-
hen. The defendant garden owner apparently had set the spring-gun 
after valuable tulips had been stolen from his garden which was lo-
cated at some distance from his house. Note the curiously distorted 
view Posner expresses of what the case "involved," a view clearly 
shaped by his radical preoccupation with efficiency and self-interest: 
The case involved two legitimate activities, raising tulips and keeping 
peahens, that happened to conflict. Different rules of liability would af-
fect differently the amount of each activity carried on. A rule that the 
spring-gun owner was not liable for the injuries inflicted on the plaintiff 
would promote tulip raising . . . . The opposite rule . . . would benefit 
peahen keeping but burden tulip growing. 32 
And so on. What is most striking about the vision of the world ex-
pressed here is that it leaves out entirely the central fact of individual 
human suffering. What the case "involved," Posner insists without 
apparent embarrassment, is simply the question of which of two eco-
nomic activities, tulip raising or peahen keeping, would be advantaged 
by drawing the liability rules one way or another. In his utter preoc-
cupation with the efficiency question - a preoccupation required by 
the deepest structures of the language he has chosen to employ - he 
virtually steps over the body of the seriously maimed young man. To 
the extent that the young man's injury and suffering are relevant at all, 
they are so, apparently, only to the extent that recognizing them 
would somehow contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources. 
In Posner's world, all such considerations become mere functions of 
the pursuit of efficiency. 
The voice we find ourselves listening to in this passage is one that 
we have heard before: it is Diodotus' voice in the Mytilenean De-
bate. 33 In a very real .and immediate sense, Posner's counsel is the 
counsel of Diodotus. The world he invites us to enter is one in which 
the rhetoric of expediency and self-interest would become the exclu-
sive rhetoric for explanation and justification of the decisions we make. 
It is a counsel repeated again and again in the course of Posner's writ-
ings. 34 To heed that counsel, White's reading of Thucydides would 
30. 4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (C.P. 1828). 
31. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. L. & EcoN. 201 (1971). 
32. Id. at 209-10. 
33. See text following note 10 supra. 
34. Posner's utilitarianism has also surfaced in his judicial opinions since assuming the 
bench. See, e.g., Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying cost-benefit analysis to 
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suggest, is to set off on a tragic course toward Melos. 
What is wrong with Posner's vision, it is important to see, is not 
that it relies upon economic theory. For if White is right, and effi-
ciency and self-interest have a legitimate place in our lives, then eco-
nomic theory itself is not the problem, but the exaggerated or 
reductionist use to which it is put by those who claim too much for it. 
The problem lies, in other words, in establishing the wrong relation-
ship to the language of efficiency analysis. To grasp this point is to 
allow us to appreciate how useful economic theory can be when 
thoughtfully and responsibly employed, and at the same time to zero 
in on the real evil: the disintegrative force set in motion when the 
rhetoric of expediency and self-interest is made the dominant or exclu-
sive rhetoric of a culture. 
When we begin to talk about experience in the way that Posner 
does in the passage quoted above, how different are we, after all, from 
the "rational" but mad narrator of Swift's Tale of a Tub? How differ-
ent is the ethical sensibility expressed in the Posner passage from the 
one expressed in that cruel but famous line from the digression on 
madness: "Last Week I saw a Woman fiay'd, and you will hardly 
believe, how much it altered her Person for the worse" (pp. 129-30). 
There is the voice of "rationality" here, but it is one operating utterly 
outside the context of those cultural traditions that, in Oppenheimer's 
phrase, "make us human." It is the voice of cold scientific rationality, 
utterly stripped of any capacity for sympathetic response. 
That is what is meant in part when it is said that radical economic 
theory of the sort we encounter in Posner's writings ultimately leads to 
a deeply disintegrative view of human experience. A culture grounded 
in such a view of experience, if White is right, would be an inherently 
unstable one. If the cultural rhetoric we employ reflects and shapes 
the character of our culture, then the disintegrative rhetoric we find in 
the writings of Posner and other radical market ideologues can never 
provide the foundation for the constitution of a truly integrated and 
stable culture. 
C. The Search for an Integrated View of Experience and the 
Language of Radical Communitarian Theory: A 
Comparison of Integrative Performance and 
Community in the Writings of White 
and Unger 
The literature of radical communitarian theory presents a more in-
teresting problem, because here is a literature whose central theme is 
deny claim that first amendment freedom of speech rights were violated, finding that the chal-
lenged leave of absence policy in that case outweighed the very slight impairment of free speech); 
Sutton v. Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982) (using a cost-benefit analysis to deny due 
process challenge to a municipal tow-first-ask-questions-later ordinance). 
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an attack on the disintegrative consequences for self and culture of the 
rise of market ideology.35 Moreover, the explicit political thrust of this 
literature is the recovery or reconstitution of a world in which the 
disparate aspects of self and community would be reintegrated into 
some sort of harmonious whole. The vision that it embraces is of a 
world in which we would all live together without strife or competi-
tion in a community of shared values - a world, indeed, in which the 
bond of shared values would be so great that the need for law itself 
would simply fall away.36 Not only is radical communitarian litera-
ture centrally concerned with the themes with which White deals here, 
it shares what might seem to be an identical aspiration: the establish-
ment of a truly integrated ethic for self and culture. Yet strangely 
enough, unlike White's achievement here, radical communitarian liter-
ature by and large fails miserably as an ethical literature. The great 
puzzle is why.37 
The effort to carve out a truly integrative ethic for self and culture 
is a central and self-conscious aspect of the jurisprudence of Roberto 
Unger, who is generally regarded as the most influential theoretician 
of the communitarian movement. Unger seems to recognize that a cul-
ture based on a mirror-image of "liberalism" (at least as he has 
crudely defined it) would not necessarily lead to an integrated view of 
the world. 38 Thus he feels impelled to try to work out, at the level of 
theory, some synthesis that will break the grip of the "dualisms" in 
our inherited thought that preclude us from achieving such a view -
persistent dualisms such as those that lead us to divide the universe 
into the general and the particular, the universal and the individual, 
the theoretical and the concrete, thought and emotion, fact and value, 
and so on. 39 Unger wants to find a way of thinking and talking about 
experience that will unite the separated referents of these traditional 
dualisms in a single, integrated view of the world. 
Thus in terms of ultimate aspiration what Unger seeks in his juris-
35. For a discussion of the ideological thrust of radical communitarian literature, see Teach· 
out, supra note 15, at 241, 241-47, 272-78. 
36. See id. at 275 n.118. 
37. It is important to recognize that communitarian literature is not monolithic, that it em· 
braces a wide variety of disparate viewpoints involving differences that are not at all unimportant 
to those theorists engaged in the communitarian movement. See generally Nash, In re Radical 
Interpretations of American Law: The Relation of Law and History, 82 MICH. L. REV. 274 
(1983). It would be impossible even to begin to do justice to those differences here. What we can 
do, however, is identify and discuss representative tendencies as they are reflected in the writings 
of one of the leading jurisprudential writers in the radical communitarian movement: Professor 
Roberto Unger. 
38. R. UNGER, supra note 25, at 106, 140-41. 
39. Unger's central preoccupation in Knowledge and Politics is with resolving what he de· 
scribes as the "antinomies" in liberal thought between "theory and fact,'' "rules and values,'' the 
"abstract and the concrete self,'' and "reason and desire." See, e.g., id. at 137 (These "antino· 
mies have never been resolved, nor will they ever until we find a way out of the prison-house of 
liberal thought."). 
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prudential writing is in some respects not far removed from what 
White sets out to do. Both aspire to discover and give expression to an 
integrative mode of addressing experience that, in essential thrust if 
not in peculiar terminology, is expressed in Coleridge's famous de-
scription of the powers of poetic imagination: 
The power [of the imagination in the poet] ... reveals itself in the bal-
ance or reconcilement of opposite or discordant qualities; of sameness, 
with difference; of the general with the concrete; the idea with the image; 
the individual with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness 
with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion with 
more than usual order; judgment ever awake and steady self-possession 
with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement . . . .40 
There is a moment, indeed, when Unger seems at the verge of recog-
nizing that the literature of the Romantic writers may represent a way 
out of the "dualism" dilemma with which he is grappling.41 And 
White incorporates Coleridge's view in his own vision of the world 
explicitly in his earlier work, The Legal Imagination, 42 and implicitly 
here. 
But at this point we come to a crucial parting of the ways. White 
imaginatively pursues the suggestion, implicit in the Coleridge pas-
sage, that we must turn to poetic and literary modes of organizing 
language and experience if we wish to escape the dualisms that con-
tribute to a disintegrative way of viewing the world.43 But Unger, 
although he seems to recognize that the poetic mode represents an 
important window of opportunity, apparently does not know what to 
make of this observation, and thus retreats back into the world of ab-
stract discourse. 
Once he has done so, of course, everything else is pretty much de-
termined, because there is no way to achieve in the abstract language 
of theory the kind of integrated view of experience that he wants to 
achieve. Although Unger wants a world in which the particular is 
fully integrated with the universal, the concrete with the abstract, and 
the individual with the collective self, the fact is that in the world we 
actually encounter in Unger's writing the particular, the concrete, and 
the individual, however important they are supposed to be, are not 
given complete or equal expression. They are not fully integrated with 
their abstract pairings. They are consigned to a subservient and reces-
sive role. 
40. S. CoLERIDGE, 2 BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA 12 (1817). 
41. R. UNGER, supra note 25, at 124 ("The Enlightenment and Romantic thinkers who 
developed the modem idea of imagination were well aware of the relationship of the analytic 
approach to the contrast of reason and desire. For they saw imagination as a faculty that unites 
thought and feeling at the same time that it makes men attentive to the organic wholeness of 
complex beings."). 
42. J. WHITE, supra note 22, at 762. 
43. See, e.g., p. 23. 
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The reality, of course, is that as long as Unger remains stranded in 
the world of abstract theory, he can never effect a full reconciliation of 
the abstract with the concrete, the general with the particular, and the 
collective with the individual self. He is working with a medium that 
has a built-in bias in favor of the abstract elements in these traditional 
pairings. That is why, in reading Unger's jurisprudence, we get the 
sense on the one hand of an intellectual effort of almost heroic propor-
tions and on the other of a deep and pervasive frustration. Unger is 
trying to make the language of theory express what it cannot possibly 
express, to make the medium of theory do what it cannot possibly do. 
That is why Unger's jurisprudential writings form by and large such a 
thought-tormented literature. Unable to effect in a full and meaning-
ful way the kind of reconciliations he wants to achieve, he is driven to 
develop more and more elaborate intellectual structures, sphere upon 
sphere, ellipse upon ellipse, until we find ourselves in the end con-
fronting a conceptual aparatus as complex and unwieldy as those mod-
els constructed in the middle ages to explain the movement of the stars 
and planets under a pre-Copernican view of the universe. 
This built-in frustration has important substantive implications for 
Unger's jurisprudence, moreover. Locked into a theoretical mode of 
discourse that tends by its deepest structures to favor the abstract over 
the concrete/ Unger begins in a very subtle but deeply significant way 
to lean toward a conception of the universe which relegates the partic-
ular, the individual, and the concrete to a subservient role. Notice, for 
example, the associations and relationships established in the follow-
ing sentences: "As a being whose life is always finite and determinate 
and who is never in fact more than a small part of what he might be, 
the person is a concrete self. . . . Because man is partial, he has a 
concrete self, and because he is universal, he has an abstract one. "44 
"Set against the background of the wealth of talents of which the spe-
cies disposes and which it is forever increasing in history, every indi-
vidual is fated to indigence, no matter how great his exertions or 
favored his circumstances. "45 
I do not want to labor here whether these statements are in some 
sense valid or invalid; indeed, I am prepared to concede that if one 
views the world in a certain slant of light they have a kind of validity. 
What I am interested in, rather, is the "slant of light" itself, because if 
it becomes the whole way - and not simply one way - of viewing the 
individual and his possibilities, it reveals a very diminished sense of 
both. When, for example, White looks at the classic works we have 
been considering, he sees ethical performances which open up for us a 
rich set of possibilities for the realization of self and community; when 
44. R. UNGER, supra note 25, at 222 (emphasis added). 
45. Id. at 222-23 (emphasis added). 
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Unger looks at the same achievements, what he sees are individual 
"exertions" that are "fated to indigence." 
There are deep-seated differences, moreover, in what is meant by 
"completeness'' in the work of the two writers. Unger's jurisprudence 
is based upon the notion that "completeness" somehow exists out 
there in the abstract.46 That is why in his writing the concrete and the 
individual are always associated with words like "small part" or "par-
tial." And that is why the constant emphasis in his writing is on the 
diminished significance of individual performances in this world - on 
how far short they fall from expressing that abstract completeness. In 
White's work, by contrast, an essential aspect of "completeness" is the 
full integration of the particular aspects of experience with the general 
or abstract. What renders the classic performances he discusses "com-
plete" is the fact that the writer finds a way to reach down into the 
world of concrete experience and incorporate fully that experience in 
the world to which he gives expression. 
This difference is vividly reflected in the radically different charac-
ter of the worlds we encounter in the writings of these two. The world 
of Unger's jurisprudence is composed largely of the material of ab-
stract thought: of types and models and concepts and disembodied 
essences. By contrast, the world of White's work is centrally com-
posed of concrete moments of experience, of individual voices, and of 
tangible ethical performances in the real world. The abstract ideologi-
cal types we encounter in Unger's writing are replaced in White's by 
distinct individual voices, both internal (such as Cleon's and Diodotus' 
in the Mytilenean Debate or those of the characters in Emma's world) 
and the external or narrative ones (such as Homer's, Plato's, Johnson's 
and Burke's). In White's work, a major part of our experience consists 
of particular moments of human encounter. One thinks back, for ex-
ample, to the tension and ambivalence in that moment in the Iliad 
when Achilles rejects the delegation from Agamemnon, or to the ten-
tativeness and poignancy of that final moment of embrace between 
Achilles and Priam. This is particular experience in all its richness 
and ambiguity and subtlety. 
These differences between White and Unger are brought home 
with even greater force if we regard their writings as compositional or 
integrative performances. Unger seeks to perform the integrative ethic 
by combining in his jurisprudence the perspectives of sociological the-
ory, political theory, linguistic theory, and so on.47 But, for all his 
endeavor, he still ends up spinning around and around in the world of 
46. See id. at 232 (failure to actualize ideal associated with "incompleteness of self"); 233 
("ideal can never be fully achieved in history," expressing sense of incompleteness of concrete 
achievement in this world) (emphasis added); 235 (this world associated with "part," ideal with 
"whole"). 
47. This view is reflected in the structure of R. UNGER, supra note 25. 
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theory itself, unable to break out of the prison of the abstract. White, 
on the other hand, takes works of imaginative and practical literature 
that are strikingly diverse in character - that represent the full range 
of possibilities for comprehending experience - and pulls them to-
gether into a highly integrated composition. Consider for a moment 
what White has done here: he has taken from ancient Greek litera-
ture, an epic poem, a history, and an example of dialectic; from eight-
eenth century English literature, a satiric tale, a group of moral essays, 
a novel of character, and a defense of English constitutionalism; and, 
from the early American constitutional experience, three very distinct 
public documents; and he has forged out of these incredibly diverse 
texts a truly integrated vision of experience. Moreover, the diversity 
itself becomes an actual source of strength and richness. In sum, the 
very structure of White's work allows him to achieve the expression of 
a deeply integrated view of experience - one in which there is genuine 
reconciliation of the abstract with the concrete, of the general with the 
particular, of the cultural with the individual self, "of sameness, with 
difference" - in a way that Unger, locked into a channel of abstract 
theoretical discourse, can never do. 
While the central thrust of both Unger's and White's work is to-
ward the expression of an integrated vision of community, there is a 
radical difference in the "communities" we actually encounter in the 
work of these two writers - a radical difference in the "communities" 
actually performed. The difference once again lies in the fact that Un-
ger is left to try to carve his vision of "community" out of the abstract 
material of theory, while White has available the extraordinary re-
sources of the literary worlds out of which his own work is composed. 
An elusive abstract quality characterizes culture and community in 
Unger's work wherever we find it. What strikes us most about Un-
ger's portrait of "liberal" culture, for example, is how little it corre-
sponds to liberal culture as we know it in the real world. What we 
encounter in Unger's writing, rather, is a kind of scarecrow construct 
- a caricature composed, as it were, by assembling in exaggerated 
form the worst features of the most extreme variants of liberal 
"thought."48 Thus we get no sense at all in Unger's writing of what 
living in a liberal culture such as our own would really be like. 
There is a sense in which Unger has to deal with liberal culture in 
the abstract. He is not concerned, it becomes clear, with describing 
48. Unger acknowledges that the "liberal" culture he portrays in Knowledge and Politics is 
an artificial composite reflecting a view of liberal culture that "nobody has ever held." R. UN· 
GER, supra note 25, at 8. It is a "reconstruction of a system of thought that [the writings of 
selected 17th and 18th century political theorists] partially exemplify." Id. at 9. Unger admits 
that his composite of liberal culture may have little in common with the views of "modem liber· 
alism." Id. And he recognizes that there are many "factors which distinguish the set of ideas 
that are the subject of this essay from what we now ordinarily call liberalism." Id. at 11. In 
short, whatever his disclaimers to the contrary, he proceeds by first creating a "strawman" and 
then taking it apart. 
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the real world of liberal culture, or even with imagining what such a 
culture might be. Rather his effort is to transform radically the very 
meaning of the term "liberal" into its negative opposite. The classic 
understanding of "the spirit of liberality" is reflected in Pericles' de-
scription of fifth century Athens as the embodiment of a generous, 
open, and discriminating spirit.49 That is what the term "liberal" 
means. In Unger's jurisprudence, by contrast, "liberal" culture is 
made to seem the embodiment of exploitative and manipulative rela-
tionships50 - it is transformed into the embodiment of mean-spirited-
ness. Language is turned on its head. We find ourselves in Unger's 
jurisprudence in a world very much like that which Thucydides de-
scribes in his History: "Words had to change their ordinary meaning 
and take that which was now given them."51 To Unger it is perfectly 
legitimate to alter the meaning of words in this way since in his world 
language is regarded as an instrument of power52 to be used and then 
ultimately discarded. 53 But, as Thucydides' History brings forcefully 
home, this sort of manipulation of language can ultimately lead to the 
tragic disintegration of community and culture. It leaves us with a 
distorted language and view of the world out of which a truly stable 
community can never be formed. 
As we proceed farther into Unger's world, what becomes increas-
ingly clear is that, for all the talk about the importance of community, 
community itself still remains an elusive abstraction. What is most 
striking about Unger's "tribal" community, for example, is that, to the 
extent it is inhabited at all, it is inhabited by faceless anonymous be-
ings playing out stock parts in some grand ideological scheme. It all 
exists, as in a sense it has to, somewhere out there in the realm of the 
abstract. 
That is why the famous ending of Unger's Knowledge and Politics 
must take the form that it does. The central movement in that work is 
away from the world of human friendship and community in all its 
problematic complexity toward the embrace of an abstract and iso-
lated "love." In the final moment of the work, surrounded by a kind 
49. See Pericles' description of the "character" of Athens in his famous funeral oration in 
THUCYDIDES, supra note 4, at 104-06. Pericles draws a sharp contrast between a culture based 
on "calculations of expediency" and one based, as he claimed Athens was, on "the confidence of 
liberality." Id. at 106. 
50. See, e.g., R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 127 (1976) (social relationships 
"manipulated"); id. at 144 (liberal culture based on "exploitation of power advantages" and "law 
of the jungle"). 
51. See text at note 4 supra. 
52. Unger's view is fairly reflected in the following statement: "He who has the power to 
decide what a thing will be called has the power to decide what it is." R. UNGER, supra note 25, 
at 80. 
53. Notice, for example, how in the final moment of Unger's Knowledge and Politics lan-
guage is separated from "essence" (love becomes "thought disembodied from language") and is 
cast aside to permit the abstract reconciliation of essence with essence. Id. at 295. 
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of self-imposed darkness, illuminated only by the halo of his own con-
ceit, Unger approaches the Godhead. Invoking the imperative form of 
address, Unger commands: "Speak, God."s4 Significantly, there is no 
answer. Only the void. 
Some readers have attempted to dismiss this closing passage as a 
mere rhetorical flourish, ss but that is a mistake. In fact this passage 
holds the key to what "community" ultimately means in Unger's 
work; it takes the form, not of human community in the real world, 
but of a kind of mute communion between essence and essence in a 
world without words. It is not accidental that the dominant impulses 
in this closing moment are those of separation and divorce: the move-
ment away from concrete reality toward the embrace of the abstract, 
and the divorce of language itself from meaning. For the vision of 
community toward which Unger's jurisprudence moves is the kind of 
community that can be realized ultimately only in the abstract - only 
"out there," cut off and isolated from the "indigent" realm of concrete 
human experience. 
At the heart of White's vision of community, by contrast, is the 
idea of friendship - not "friendship" in the abstract but friendship as 
we know it. It is friendship as it is embodied, at least in part, in the 
relationship that develops between Emma and Mr. Knightley in Aus-
ten's Emma as they move from the false or "sentimental" friendship 
we encounter in the early chapters to a "critical" friendship based on a 
more complex way of organizing language and experience. It is 
shaped as well by the coming together of Emma and Mr. Knightley in 
the closing moments of the novel, forming as it were a sort of marriage 
of imagination and judgment. What this final coming together repre-
sents is not an indiscriminate blurring of the differences between imag-
ination and judgment. Both terms, as do both characters, retain their 
independence and autonomy. But at the same time, in the forming of 
this union, each takes on an added richness and depth and stability. 
Reflected here, it is important to see, is the same kind of relationship 
that is established in White's world between other paired terms, such 
as "justice" and "efficiency" in his reading of Thucydides' History, s6 
or "liberty" and "order" in his reading of Burke's Reflections. s7 It is 
the relationship expressed in Coleridge's description of the poetic im-
agination as it reveals itself in "the balance or reconcilement of oppo-
site or discordant qualities; of sameness, with difference. "S8 White's 
world, in· other words, is like Burke's in the sense that relationships at 
every level of experience - at the level of language, of interpersonal 
54. Id. 
55. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 37, at 327. 
56. See text following note 12 supra. 
57. See text at Part I.B.4. supra. 
58. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
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relationship, of organization of political community, of culture, and 
indeed, of the natural universe59 - all reflect, to borrow Burke's 
phrase, "the same course and order." At the heart of this world is a 
complex relationship of "critical friendship" that creates a bond of 
reciprocity and interdependence but at the same time enriches the 
character and enhances the autonomy of the self. 
Significantly, it is a relationship embodied as well in the principal 
literary form through which, in Austen's novel, the action develops 
and relationships and character are formed: the conversation between 
friends. If abstract theory represents the paradigmatic mode for estab-
lishment of community in Unger's jurisprudence, it is the conversation 
between friends that replaces it in White's work. The choice of the 
conversational form, like the choice of dialectic, implies a commitment 
to a substantive vision of human relationships in which the partners to 
conversation are not simply theorists, as are the participants in Un-
ger's universe of discourse, but whole persons like ourselves, strug-
gling as we must do to make sense out of the world. The 
conversational form also has many of the same attributes and virtues 
of dialectic: it requires a relationship of mutual trust and respect, and 
it depends upon the independence and autonomy of the conversational 
partners. It establishes, that is to say, that crucial relationship of mu-
tual reciprocity. 
The most impressive aspect of our experience in White's work is 
the way in which this elemental relationship of friendship comes to 
form a critical bond which links the individual literary performances 
we have been considering into a single community of shared endeavor. 
The very structure of the composition serves to establish and reinforce 
the deep sense that we are in the presence of a real and vital commu-
nity formed by the pervasive interdependencies of these classic works. 
Underlying the basic structure of White's work is a central conception: 
that these literary and ethicai performances themselves represent acts 
of "friendship" in the educations they offer about how to get along in a 
complex world and in the possibilities they open up for the realization 
of self and community. Individually viewed, each work, each act of 
59. Consider in this respect the centrality of the metaphors of "reciprocity" and "tension" 
and "complexity'' in White's description of the composition of language, self, and culture. His 
reading of the Iliad, for example, is shaped by the notion that its central movement is not the 
kind of linear movement we· might find in a theoretical tract, but rather a movement back and 
forth from one perspective to another, leading to a cumulative complication of perspective. In 
his reading of Thucydides' History, the central idea is that of the relationship of reciprocity that 
must exist between contrary terms, between claim and limit, and of a parallel reciprocity that 
must exist between self and world. And in his reading of Plato's Gorgias, White views dialectic 
as the procedural embodiment of the reciprocal relationship between opposed views expressed in 
the context of a shared endeavor. The central imagery - of "complexity" and "reciprocity" and 
the suspension of opposed impulses or forces in a kind of perpetual "tension" - is that which we 
would expect to find in the description of a complex ecological system. In each case, the stability 
of the system - the language, the self, the culture, the natural world - is a direct function of its 
internal complexity. 
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friendship, creates a community of two between individual writer and 
reader; cumulatively they form a durable cultural community linking 
us backward and forward through time to generations that have come 
before and to those yet unborn. By reading these classic works to-
gether, as White does here, each in the light of the others, those link-
ages which in fact exist at some deep subconscious cultural level are to 
a certain degree rendered visible and explicit. The dominant impres-
sion we bring away as a consequence is that of a chain of interlocking 
"friendships." We are all part of the same community; the struggles of 
those who have come before are ours, and ours theirs; and their 
achievements represent both an education and an example by which 
we conduct our own lives. 
The communal bond that is created by such a perspective is a pow-
erful one, based as it is in a sense of common struggle. When we sit 
down to write a brief, or prepare our summation to the jury, or do any 
of the other things that we as lawyers do, our struggle is in a very real 
sense the same as Homer's as he endeavored to forge out of the materi-
als he was given to work with a more complex vision of human pos-
sibilities; the same as Thucydides' as he struggled to make sense out of 
a world in which words had lost their meaning; as Plato's as he sought 
to reconstitute language in a way that would make ethically integrated 
discourse possible; and so it is with all the others. 
In preserving a relation as he has done here with those who have 
come before, with those whose creative literary efforts have in earlier 
times led to the reconstitution of inherited culture, White has given us 
a new sense of both our responsibilities and our possibilities as law-
yers. He makes us see here that such "genuine reconstitution" of our 
culture and its discourse is a central and inescapable responsibility of 
the lawyer. For better or worse, we are central participants in the 
shared endeavor of reconstituting the world we have inherited. 
Whether it is transformed into a better world - more decent and 
more just - is ultimately up to us. 
James Boyd White's When Words Lose Their Meaning is a work of 
great originality and integrity. It is rare that one comes across a work 
where everything comes together as it does here, where there is an 
almost perfect correspondence between the critical method that is em-
ployed and the vision toward which the work proceeds, between the 
ethical sensibility that is expressed at the level of individual paragraph 
and the large imaginative pattern which gives the work its structure 
and meaning, where finally performance and vision merge so com-
pletely that it becomes impossible, to borrow an image from Yeats, "to 
know the dancer from the dance."60 That is not to say White turns in 
a perfect performance here. One encounters in this work the same 
60. w. YEATS, Among School Children, in THE VARIORUM EomoN OF THE POEMS OF 
W.B. YEATS 443, 446 (P. Allt & R. Alspach eds. 1957). 
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sorts of problems one encounters in almost any work: the false starts, 
the misplaced claims, the occasional tendency to get carried away by 
one's own internal vocabulary, the establishment at times of the wrong 
tone. These are but minor and forgivable lapses, however, in a work 
that in its broad conception, in its deeply imaginative implementation, 
and in the vast part of its great rich detail, is fundamentally sound. 
Yet having come this far, there is still the lingering question of 
what all this has to do with the great problems of injustice and oppres-
sion and human suffering which exist in the world. I do not have a 
complete answer to this question, but I can try to suggest the form 
such an answer might take. It is not, it seems to me, a question of 
whether or not we want" to confront such problems. Problems of injus-
tice and human suffering are our problems, they are our inescapable 
responsibility. We are all, White makes us see, trustees of the human 
spirit. The only question, really, is the ethical perspective we bring to 
bear on such problems as we seek to understand them and deal with 
them to the extent our resources will allow. It is here that White's 
book offers us something that, in my estimate at least, no other recent 
jurisprudential work has even come close to offering: it offers a lan-
guage, to borrow the words of another writer, "with grandeur to 
match the proportions of [the] endeavor upon which we are 
embarked."61 
61. N. MAILER, OF A FIRE ON THE MOON 274 (1970). 
